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Substantive Due Process and the Involuntary
Confinement of Sexually Violent Predators
ERIC S. JANUS" & WAYNE A. LOGAN"
I. INTRODUCTION
Social historians will doubtless look back on the 1990s as a period of
remarkable economic growth and stability in American society. At the
same time, however, they will have to reconcile a contemporaneous, seem-
ingly paradoxical social occurrence: The nation's undertaking of an un-
precedented massive experiment in social control-mainly by use of im-
prisonment,' but also by other more novel means.2 A foremost target of
* Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. Professor Janus served as co-counsel in
extended litigation challenging the constitutionality of Minnesota's Sexually Dangerous Person Act.
See In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 171 (Minn. 1996); In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 167 (Minn. 1996), cert.
granted andjudgment vacated sub nom. Linehan v. Minnesota, 522 U.S. 1011 (1997), on remand, In re
Linehan, 594 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 1999). cert. denied sub nom. Linehan v. Minnesota, 528 U.S. 1049
(1999); In re Linehan, 518 N.W.2d 609 (Minn. 1994).
**Associate Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law. The authors thank Deb Jessen,
class of 2003, for her research assistance, and Meg Daniel for her editorial support.
ISee U.S. DEP'T OF JUST.: BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, BULLETIN: PRISON AND JAIL INMATES
AT MIDYEAR 2001, at 1 (2001) (noting that from 1990 to 2000, the nation's prison and jail populations
grew by 783,157 inmates, a 5.6% annual rate of increase), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pjim00.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2002) (on file with the Con-
necticut Law Review). See generally MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE (1999); THE SENTENC-
ING PROJECT, U.S. SURPASSES RUSSIA AS WORLD LEADER IN RATE OF INCARCERATION 1 (2000),
available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/brief/usvsrus.pdf (last visited Oct. 21,2002) (on file with
the Connecticut Law Review).
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these strategies has been sex offenders, a criminal sub-population that his-
torically inspired unique fear and disdain, and continues to do so today.
Faced with the prospect of sex offenders being set free at the end of their
prison terms, and catalyzed by high-profile sexual victimizations of women
and children, legislators took action.4 One outgrowth has been registration
and community notification laws, now in effect nationwide, which seek to
deter recidivist sexual offenders by providing police and citizens alike with
information on released sex offenders, and to facilitate apprehension of
offenders should recidivism occur.5 Another method has targeted espe-
cially fearsome offenders (often referred to as "sexually violent predators,"
or "SVP"s) for actual physical confinement, after completion of prison
terms, pursuant to civil commitment. Together, the methods are corner-
stones of what has been aptly called America's emerging "preventive
state," which, rather than achieving social control by means of avowedly
penal regimes behind prison walls, seeks to "identify and neutralize dan-
gerous individuals before they commit crimes by restricting their liberty in
a variety of ways."
This Article addresses commitment laws, the more aggressive of the
2 See Michael Tonry, Rethinking Unthinkable Punishment Policies in America, 46 UCLA L. REV.
1751, 1752 (1999) (noting that "[wie live in a repressive era when punishment policies that would be
unthinkable in other times and places are not only commonplace but also are enthusiastically supported
by public officials, policy intellectuals, and much of the general public").
3See. e.g.. State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 287 N.W. 297, 299 (Minn. 1939), aff'd, 309
U.S. 270 (1940) (referring to persons committed pursuant to the State's then-new "sex psychopath" law
as "unnaturals"); see also ADAM SAMPSON, ACTS OF ABUSE: SEX OFFENDERS AND THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 124 (1994) (noting that "[t]he vehemence of the hatred for sex offenders is unmatched
by attitudes to any other offenders"); Peter Davis, The Sex Offender Next Door, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July
28, 1996, at 20, 43 (likening sex offenders to lepers); David Van Biema, Burn Thy Neighbor: Where
Can A Child Molester Go After Serving Time? Not Home, TIME, July 26, 1993, at 58 (noting the com-
mon perception of sex offenders as "irredeemable monsters").
4 As social historian Philip Jenkins has observed, incidents of sexual violence have led to a
"moral panic" and aggressive legislative reactions in three different periods-the 1910s, 1940s, and
1990s. See PHILIP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF THE CHILD MOLESTER IN MOD-
ERN AMERICA 6, 11-12 (1998); see also Edwin H. Sutherland, The Diffusion of Sexual Psychopath
Laws, 56 AM. J. SOC. 142, 143-47 (1950) (noting how the prior generation of "sexual psychopath" laws
was triggered, in part, by a "hysteria"). Professor Deborah Denno's research, however, examining the
period from 1937 to 1957, suggests that this legislative preoccupation was driven less by reportage of
particularly brutal sex crimes than by an emerging "emphasis on psychiatry, family, and children."
Deborah W. Denno, Life Before the Modern Sex Offender Statutes, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 1317, 1321
(1998). For more on the cyclical nature of deviant commitment laws, see John Pratt, The Rise and Fall
of Homophobia and Sexual Psychopath Legislation in Postwar Society, 4 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y, & L.
25 (1998).
5Wayne A. Logan, Liberty Interests in the Preventive State: Procedural Due Process and Sex Of-
fender Community Notification Laws, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1167, 1169 (1998).
6 Carol S. Steiker, The Limits of the Preventive State, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 771, 774
(1998); see also Eric Janus, Civil Commitment as Social Control: Managing the Risk of Sexual Vio-
lence, in DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL ORDER 84, 85 (Mark Brown & John
Pratt eds., 2000) (observing that SVP laws entail a "ritual exile," confining a "small, aberrational group
of 'others"').
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innovations currently used in sixteen U.S. jurisdictions.' The laws, by de-
sign, operate at the margins of the justice system,8 and have been largely
immune from constitutional attack. Notably, in 1997 the Supreme Court
concluded in Kansas v. Hendricks? that the laws do not constitute "pun-
ishment"-and hence do not violate the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeop-
ardy Clauses-freeing the states to impose the laws retroactively and in
addition to criminal sentences.'0 Confident in the legality of their laws,
states have confined over 2400 SVPs during the past several years."
Although the predominant motivation for SVP commitment laws is in-
capacitation, states uniformly promise treatment as an ancillary purpose.
Indeed, it is this "treatment" purpose that marks the high-security, long-
term incapacitation characteristic of SVP regimes as non-punitive, and
insulates them from constitutional challenge. Yet, in practice, the prom-
ised treatment most often goes unredeemed. More than a decade into the
SVP experiment, almost no committees have been released, even provi-
sionally.
The ever-growing populations housed in these facilities highlight the
ongoing uncertainty over the obligations of government to those it involun-
tarily commits. To date, the Supreme Court has embraced the promise of
treatment in justifying its rejection of constitutional challenges sounding in
ex post facto and double jeopardy principles. The time has now come to
redeem the promise of treatment, requiring that the Court ensure that the
SVP laws are being applied in a manner true to the substantive due process
commands associated with "civil" commitment.
In this Article we argue that SVP commitment laws, rather than operat-
ing in a netherworld of constitutional immunity, fit squarely within the
delimiting principles and constraints of substantive due process. Prior de-
cisions by the Court make clear that civil committees possess at least two
distinct, yet closely related, substantive due process rights. First, those
involuntarily confined by civil means are entitled to non-punitive condi-
tions of confinement. 2 Second, at the very least, the nature of conditions
and duration of confinement must "bear some reasonable relation" to the
7 W. LAWRENCE FITCH, SEX OFFENDER COMMITMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: LEGISLATIVE AND
POLICY CONCERNS IN SEXUAL COERCION: UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGEMENT (Robert Prentky et al.
eds.) forthcoming 2003) (noting that 15 states and the District of Columbia have SVP laws).
See generally C. Peter Erlinder, Minnesota s Gulag: Involuntary Treatment for the "Politically
fI, " 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 99 (1993).
9 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
'0 Id. at 368-69.
11 See FITCH, supra note 7 (noting that more than 1,200 persons have been detained pursuant to
modern SVP laws).
12 See, e.g., Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412 (2002); Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363; Foucha v.
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S 739, 741-48 (1987).
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avowed civil purpose of confinement. 3 What remains unclear, however,
after several decades of litigation, is how these two rights interrelate in
assessing the constitutionality of involuntary civil commitments. In par-
ticular, when, if ever, do constitutionally substandard conditions of con-
finement, especially the lack of effective treatment, render the confinement
itself unconstitutional? This, in turn, presents a pragmatic question of cen-
tral importance: When do such substandard conditions mandate the release
of detainees, as opposed to simply supporting injunctive or monetary re-
lief? 4
This inquiry is prompted by the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Seling v. Young,'" where the Court held that release from civil commitment
is unavailable, even in the face of "serious" concern over the confinement
conditions experienced by a habeas corpus petitioner. 6 In Young, the
Court rejected ex post facto and double jeopardy claims brought by a re-
cidivist sex offender involuntarily confined pursuant to Washington's SVP
law, reasoning that the law was civil at its origin, and was not rendered
criminal by the subsequent failure of the State to afford proper conditions
and treatment. 7 The Court acknowledged, but did not expound upon, the
availability of a substantive due process right to a petitioner such as
Young.' This acknowledgment suggests that due process supports rights
and remedies that are distinct from, and not subject to the particular limits
of, the ex post facto and double jeopardy analysis foremost in Young-a
matter tantalizingly left open by the Court.
This jurisprudential caveat is of major importance given the consider-
able latitude the Court has afforded states in the implementation of their
SVP laws. In Hendricks, for instance, rather than adhering to its prior in-
sistence that committees be "mentally ill" and "dangerous,"' 9 the Court
instructed that substantive due process permits the commitment of danger-
ous individuals with a "mental abnormality" or "personality disorder" 2°-a
13 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
14 Our analysis here should be distinguished from a cognate inquiry that has received consider-
able attention, namely, when confinement-related claims may be brought in federal court pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (which does not require exhaustion of state remedies), versus when they may be brought
as habeas claims (which require exhaustion). In Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973), the
Supreme Court held that cases challenging "the very fact or duration of the confinement itself' must be
brought under the habeas rubric, whereas those seeking correction of conditions of confinement (but
not release) may be brought under § 1983. Our analysis in a sense combines two branches of the Prei-
ser puzzle: We ask when unconstitutional conditions of confinement infect the "fact or duration" of
confinement, thereby requiring release.
iS 531 U.S. 250 (2001).
16 1d. at 263.
17 See id.
Is See id. at 258-59.
19 See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 78 (1992).
20 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358-60 (1997).
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considerably more inviting standard. More recently, in its 2002 decision in
Kansas v. Crane,2 the Court held that substantive due process imposes
limits on the types of mental abnormalities that can serve as commitment
predicates, but stopped short of requiring proof of a "total or complete lack
of control," requiring only that committees have serious difficulty in con-
trolling their dangerous behavior. 2
While Hendricks and Crane help clarify the substantive due process
limits on the state's power to commit, as an initial matter, they do not
speak to its subsequent authority to retain control over committees. This
authority must inevitably be supported by the putative civil rationale that
constitutionally redeems the commitment laws themselves---"civil" treat-
ment. Social science data now becoming available, however, raise real
doubts over whether this treatment purpose is being attained or, indeed,
even being seriously pursued. Perhaps the most glaring piece of evidence
relates to the dramatic paucity of committees released since the modem
reemergence of the laws in the early 1990s. 3  These meager release rates
are not surprising given the natural aversion of system actors to release,
and communities to accept, sex offenders.24 But they are also explained by
the persistent lack of scientific consensus about the effectiveness of sex
21 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
22 Id. at 411-12. The majority added that "[i]nsistence upon absolute lack of control would risk
barring the civil commitment of highly dangerous persons suffering severe mental abnormalities." Id.
at 412. In so holding, the Court sought to elucidate the cryptic language in Hendricks that states could
commit individuals who found it "difficult, if not impossible," to control their urge to sexually victim-
ize. Id. at 411 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358). Stopping short of requiring that a committee have
a "complete inability" to control his behavior, the 7-2 majority emphasized that volitional impairments
cannot be measured with "mathematical precision," and welcomed a case-by-case evolution of the law.
Id. at 411-14 (noting that the majority's decision was motivated by a desire to "proceed[] deliberately
and contextually" and eschew "absolutist" and "bright-line" rules). Whether the modified standard will
provide sufficient guidance in commitment decisions-or, as Justice Scalia warned in dissent, remains
so imprecise as to provide states "not a clue as to how.., to charge the jury"-remains to be seen. Id.
at 423 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
23 Roxanne Lieb and Craig Nelson report that as of June 2000, fewer than 2% of 1757 SVPs un-
der detention nationwide had been released even conditionally. See Roxanne Lieb & Craig Nelson,
Treatment Programs for Sexually Violent Predators-A Review of States, in 2 THE SEXUAL PREDATOR:
LEGAL ISSUES, CLINICAL ISSUES, SPECIAL POPULATIONS 5-4 (Anita Schlank ed., 2001). Removing
Arizona, which had a rate of release substantially greater than the other states (15%, compared to the
next most successful state, Washington, which had a 4% release rate), the overall rate of release was
1%. Id; see also Sarah E. Spierling, Note, Lock Them Up and Throw Away the Key: How Washington's
Violent Sexual Predator Law Will Shape the Future Balance Between Punishment and Prevention, 9
J.L. & POL'Y 879, 881-82, 920-21 (2001) (noting that since 1990, only five committees have been
released in Washington); Paul Demko, Throwing Away the Key, CITY PAGES (Minneapolis-St.Paul,
Minn.), Mar. 13, 2002, at 15 (noting that since 1994 only one Minnesota committee has been released
even conditionally).
24 See, e.g., Sarah Duran, State Pays a Price to House Sex Offenders, MORNING NEWS TRIB. (Ta-
coma, Wash.), May 19, 2002, at A I (describing local opposition to citing of halfway houses for SVPs),
2002 WL 3197484.
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offender treatment" and the inability of experts to determine, either pre- or
post-commitment, whether any particular sex offender's risk will be or has
been reduced by treatment.26 The situation is exacerbated all the more to
the extent that one-size-fits-all treatment approaches characterize SVP pro-
grams,27 pursued in lieu of more expensive (and appropriate) individualized
approaches.28 Finally, while the laws are promoted and justified on the
ground that they target only the "most dangerous" sex offenders, the reality
is that they confine a full spectrum of individuals,29 from sadistic rapist-
murderers to exhibitionists" and gropers.3
25 See Eric S. Janus, Treatment and the Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders, in PROTECTING SO-
CIETY FROM DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: LAW, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY (Bruce J. Winick & John Q.
LaFond eds., forthcoming) (manuscript on file with author) (summarizing literature on treatment effi-
cacy).
26 1d; see also Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1985) (observing that "[pisychiatry is not...
an exact science, and psychiatrists disagree widely and frequently on what constitutes mental illness, on
the appropriate diagnosis to be attached to given behavior and symptoms . . . and on likelihood of
future dangerousness"). For a discussion of the arguably inherent uncertainties of diagnosing mental
illness, see Lars Noah, Pigeonholing Illness: Medical Diagnosis as a Legal Construct, 50 HASTINGS
L.J. 241,248-49 (1999).
27 Elizabeth A. Weeks, The Newly Found "Compassion " For Sexually Violent Predators: Civil
Commitment and the Right to Treatment in the Wake of Kansas v. Hendricks, 32 GA. L. REv. 1261,
1294 (1998) (noting "similar treatment for the entire category of [sex] offenders" in SVP facilities); see
also Janice K. Marques, Professional Standards for Civil Commitment Programs, in 2 THE SEXUAL
PREDATOR: LEGAL ISSUES, CLINICAL ISSUES, SPECIAL POPULATIONS 2-9 (Anita Schlank ed., 2001)
(surveying uniform treatment plans and disclaiming "one-size-fits-all" approaches).
Social science data suggest that sex offenders do not comprise a homogeneous group. See
Marques, supra note 27, at 2-9 (stating that "individuals entering civil commitment programs are a very
diverse group"); R. Karl Hanson et al., Long-Term Recidivism of Child Molesters, 61 J. CONSULTING &
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 646, 646 (1993) (noting the importance of distinguishing between high and low
risk offenders). Furthermore, it is well-established that distinct patterns of sexual offending require
distinct treatment approaches. See W.L. Marshall & W.D. Pithers, A Reconsideration of Treatment
Outcome with Sex Offenders, 21 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 10, 20 (1994) (discussing the need for varied
treatment approaches for distinct offender types); Danielle M. Polizzi et al., What Works in Adult Sex
Offender Treatment? A Review of Prison-and-Non-Prison-Based Treatment Programs, 43 INT'L J.
OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 357, 372 (1999) (noting the lack of studies regarding
treatment modalities for particular types of offenders). In fact, some forms of treatment can actually
worsen the pathology of certain groups of offenders, e.g., those with psychopathy. See Barbara K.
Schwartz, The JRI Model for Treating Varied Populations with Inappropriate Sexual Behavior, in 4
THE SEX OFFENDER: CURRENT TREATMENT MODALITIES AND SYSTEMS ISSUES 1-16 (Barbara K.
Schwartz ed., 2002); Tony Ward & Stephen M. Hudson, A Self-Regulation Model of Relapse Preven-
tion, in REMAKING RELAPSE PREVENTION WITH SEX OFFENDERS: A SOURCEBOOK 79, 80 (D. Richard
Laws et al. eds., 2000).
29 See, e.g., Eric S. Janus & Nancy H. Walbek, Sex Offender Commitments in Minnesota. A De-
scriptive Study of Second Generation Commitments, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 343, 371 (2000) (observing
wide variation among SVP committees on indices commonly associated with dangerousness).
30 See, e.g., In re Clements, 440 N.W.2d 133 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (affirming the commitment
of an exhibitionist).
31 See Demko, supra note 23 (describing the case of Timothy Same, whose criminal sexual con-
duct sentence was stayed on the condition that he voluntarily commit himself as a sexual psychopathic
personality).
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Given the uncertainty and expense of treatment, a strong temptation
exists for states to simply warehouse committees, much as in their avow-
edly criminal systems. In a sense, viewed in historical context, this pessi-
mism should be no surprise, for it was a commonplace reaction to the
"sexual psychopath" laws in effect from the 1930s to the 1960s, the direct
antecedents of modem SVP laws.32 Eventually, courts and policy-makers
lost faith in those earlier laws, leading to their repeal and abandonment.33
Today, courts and policy-makers seem largely unconcerned.34 The con-
temporary apathy is all the more alarming when one compares the current
near-zero "success" rates with the fact that at least some of the earlier laws
eventually released as many as fifty percent of committees." As a result,
rather than being a "step away" from confinements for dangerousness
alone,36 the SVP laws suggest a regime of preventive detention itself, here-
tofore anathema to due process.37
To a degree, this concern over warehousing is arguably of limited prac-
tical magnitude, given that the numbers of persons now committed is rela-
tively small, and that newly-enacted sentencing provisions have ensured
32 See W. Lawrence Fitch & Richard James Ortega, Law and the Confinement of Psychopaths, 18
BEHAV. So. & L. 663, 664-67 (2000) (discussing evolution of sex offender laws); Barbara A. Weiner,
Mental Disability and the Criminal Law, in THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 743 (Samuel Jan
Brackel et al. eds., 3d ed. 1985) (noting that several professional organizations urged the repeal of
earlier SVP laws).
33 AM. BAR ASS'N, ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 459-60 (1989);
GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHIATRY AND SEX PSYCHOPATH LEGISLATION:
THE 30S TO THE 80S, at 843 (1977). One landmark study of the era, for instance, expressed concern
over the lack of any real treatment efforts to cure or rehabilitate these offenders after they are commit-
ted:
Their "treatment" is almost purely custodial.... Hospital administrators generally indicate that
they are completely impotent to provide even experimental treatment efforts for their sex psycho-
paths. . . . [l]t is a travesty to assume that by mere custodial hospitalization a state can solve ei-
ther the purposes of rehabilitation or of community protection.
PAUL W. TAPPAN, THE HABITUAL SEX OFFENDER: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COM-
MISSION ON THE HABITUAL SEX OFFENDER 32-33 (1950), cited in State v. Newton, Ill A.2d 272, 275-
77 (N.J. 1955) (Brennan, J.).
34See, e.g., Demko, supra note 23 (quoting Ramsey County (Minnesota) Attorney Susan Gaert-
ner as characterizing the dearth of SVP discharges as a sign that the system is working properly).
35 See Lawrence T. Burick, An Analysis of the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, 59 J.
CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 254, 261 n.73 (1968) (discussing release data from 1938 to
1952).
36 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 83 (1992).
37 See, e.g., Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (condemning "sexual psycho-
path" laws-a predecessor to modem SVP laws-for being equivalent to "a warehousing operation for
social misfits"); Williamson v. United States, 184 F.2d 280, 282 (2d Cir. 1950) (Jackson, J.) (stating
that "[i]imprisonment to protect society from predicted but unconsummated offenses is so unprece-
dented in this country and so fraught with danger of excesses and injustice that I am loath to resort to it
.... .).
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longer determinate prison terms for sex offenders, 3 to some extent obviat-
ing the need for SVP facilities. However, the enormous appeal of segregat-
ing "predators" will surely encourage the continued use of commitment
laws, given that they promise indefinite detention39 and provide a safety
valve for plea-bargained sentences that are inevitable in the real world of
criminal justice." But what must also be recognized is that the jurispru-
dence in this context is readily transferable to other, related contexts, in
particular preventive detention of terrorism suspects"' and individuals who
threaten the public health. 2 The lessons learned from involuntary civil
commitment of sex offenders thus have direct relevance as we attempt to
locate the limits of this type of intervention. Finally, from a purely prag-
matic perspective, judicial scrutiny of commitment duration and efficacy
will assist politicians and policy makers in best utilizing scarce treatment
38 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUST.: BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: TRUTH IN
SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS (1999) (surveying the effects of newly implemented laws), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ltssp.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2002) (on file with the Connecticut
Law Review).
39See MINN. DEP'T OF CORR., SEX OFFENDER POLICY AND MANAGEMENT BOARD STUDY 21
(2000) [hereinafter SEX OFFENDER POLICY], available at
http://www.corr.state.mn.us/publications/legislativereports/pdf/sexoffenderboard.pdf (last visited Oct.
21, 2002) (on file with the Connecticut Law Review) (concluding that "attempting to target just the
very small group of offenders who are potentially eligible for civil commitment referral with longer
sentencing options (particularly mandatory sentences) would probably not result in elimination of the
need for civil commitment of a select, high-risk group of sex offenders"); CIVIL COMMITMENT TASK
FORCE OF THE STATE OF MINN., 1988 REPORT TO THE COMMISSIONER OF THE MINNESOTA DEPART-
MENT OF HUMAN SERVICES 48 (1999) (observing that sex offender commitment laws are needed to
incarcerate offenders who "may be dangerous but evade conviction due to the high burden of proof
required in criminal cases").
40 See SEX OFFENDER POLICY, supra note 39, at 17 (reporting that enhanced sentences are often
used as bargaining chips in plea negotiations); cf Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 373 (1997)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that "[ilf the civil system is used simply to impose punishment after
the State makes an improvident plea bargain on the criminal side, then it is not performing its proper
function").
41 See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2001) (suggesting that "terrorism or other
special circumstances" might provide "special arguments ... for forms of preventive detention and for
heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches with respect to matters of national
security"); Katharine Q. Seelye, War on Terror Makes for Odd Twists in Justice System: Flexible Rules
Raise Constitutional Issues, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2002, at Al 6 (quoting a senior administration official
who characterized the indefinite detention of American terrorism suspects as "not a punitive action,"
but rather "self-protection"). See generally Kristin Choo, Controversial Cure: Proposed CDC Model
Act on Bioterrorism Seeks to Clarify State Enforcement Powers, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2002, at 20.
42 See, e.g., 2002 Minn. Laws 402 (establishing the Minnesota Emergency Health Powers Act
with provisions for quarantine and isolation); CTR. FOR LAW & THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH, THE MODEL
STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT 27 (2001) (providing for quarantine and isolation during
"emergencies"), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf (last visited
Oct. 21,2002) (on file with the Connecticut Law Review); see also Edward P. Richards, The Jurispru-
dence of Prevention: The Right of Societal Self-Defense Against Dangerous Individuals, 16 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 329, 329 (1989) ("As America moves into the twenty-first century, we must determine to
what extent individual liberties must be sacrificed for the common good. Ideals of liberty and privacy
are stretched to the limit as modem fears of street crime merge with ancient fears of plague.").
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and prevention resources.43
The Article begins with a discussion of Seling v. Young," examining
the result and rationales of the Court, followed by a review of the Court's
substantive due process jurisprudence as it has developed in the context of
involuntary civil commitment. While the Court has insisted that substan-
tive due process provides only weak limits on state action in many areas,
civil commitment persists as one of the select categories sufficient to trig-
ger closer constitutional scrutiny.45 However, while the Court has repeat-
edly intoned that there are limits to commitment authority, requiring in
particular that the nature or conditions and duration of commitment bear
some reasonable relation to its purpose, the constitutional calculus remains
uncertain.
Focusing in particular on decisions addressing conditions of confine-
ment and the obligation of government to treat those it involuntarily com-
mits pursuant to its police power, we will argue that substantially more
than the mere warehousing of "social misfits" is called for. Although
widely cited dicta suggest otherwise, we argue that the Court's substantive
due process jurisprudence entails an expectation of individual treatment
efficacy, the enforcement of which is triggered by the state's failure over
time to deliver on its treatment promise. To be sure, states deserve sub-
stantial deference in the operation of their SVP laws. This deference, how-
ever, is circumscribed by the heightened scrutiny courts must use in patrol-
ling the border between the civil and criminal systems of social control,
such as with SVP laws. We then examine a series of lower court decisions
that have engaged in such patrol, demonstrating that these decisions sup-
port, or at least leave open, the enforcement of an effective right to treat-
ment. The Article concludes by offering some guidelines and criteria for
implementing the proposed constitutional analysis advanced.
43 See generally Eric S. Janus, Sexual Predator Commitment Laws: Lessons for Law and the Be-
havioral Sciences, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 5, 18 (2000) (discussing resource allocation choices necessi-
tated by SVP laws).
4531 U.S. 250 (2001).
45See, e.g., Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002) (noting that the standard for commitment
"must be sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender ... from the dangerous but typical
recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case") (emphasis added); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S.
71, 80 (1992) ("It is clear that commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of
liberty that requires due process protection.") (quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361
(1983)); see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 316 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting generally
that the "institutionalization of an adult by the government triggers heightened, substantive due process
scrutiny.").
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I. SELING V. YOUNG: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT UNDER EX POST
FACTO AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY ANALYSIS
Seling v. Young46 concerned the involuntary civil commitment of An-
dre Young, a recidivist rapist who was one of the first sex offenders tar-
geted by Washington State's Community Protection Act of 1990."' Under
the law, "sexually violent predators," persons convicted of or charged with
a crime of sexual violence, and who suffer from a "mental abnormality" or
"personality disorder" that makes them likely to commit further acts of
criminal sexual violence, are subject to indefinite, involuntary civil con-
finement by the state 8 Washington authorities, invoking the law, success-
fully petitioned to have Young committed subsequent to his release from
prison in October 1990.9
Young challenged his commitment in Washington state court alleging
that it constituted punishment and hence violated the Ex Post Facto and
Double Jeopardy Clauses of the U.S. Constitution."0 The state court re-
jected these claims, reasoning that the commitment law was civil, not
criminal, in nature."' In addition, Young claimed that substantive due pro-
cess was violated by the conditions of confinement and quality of treatment
available, amounting to impermissible preventive detention. 2 The court
likewise rejected Young's due process claim, reasoning that he failed to
"show that the specific conditions of his confinement are incompatible with
treatment," and that the law "provide[d] for treatment, and [Young] ...
failed to prove that this goal cannot be effectuated under the Statute's
terms. 5 3
A. Federal Habeas Corpus Proceedings
Young then sought habeas corpus relief in the Western District of
Washington and raised the identical trio of constitutional claims, this time
winning relief. On the due process challenge, Judge Coughenour held that
the commitment law violated substantive due process because it permitted
indefinite civil confinement of persons without a requisite showing of
46 531 U.S. 250 (2001).
47 Id. at 253.
48 Id. at 250, 253 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (1992)).
49 Id. at 255-56.
501 d. at 256 (citing In re Young, 857 P.2d 989 (1993) (en banc)).
5 1 Id. at 256-57 (citing Young, 857 P.2d at 996-1000).
52 Id. at 259 (citing Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995)).
53 Id. at 262. Thecourt added that the record was devoid of evidence "addressing either the ac-
tual conditions of confinement, or the quality of treatment. These issues are not currently before the
court. Facially, the Statute and associated regulations suggest that the nature and duration of commit-
ment is compatible with the purposes of the commitment." Young, 857 P.2d at 1005.
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"mental illness."54 Moreover, the law violated ex post facto and double
jeopardy principles because "the Statute cannot be classified as civil, con-
sidering the relevant factors.""
While the State's appeal of Judge Coughenour's order was pending be-
fore the Ninth Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Kansas v.
Hendricks,56 which rejected similar constitutional challenges to a nearly
identical law, Kansas' Sexually Violent Predator Act." Accordingly, the
Ninth Circuit remanded the matter for reconsideration in light of
Hendricks.8 On remand, Young amended his petition, focusing for the
first time on the actual conditions of confinement that he was experiencing
in commitment. 9 The district court denied the petition and Young again
appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 60
At the outset of its opinion, the Ninth Circuit noted that Young ad-
vanced both ex post facto/double jeopardy and substantive due process
claims, stemming from the application of the Washington law as newly
alleged in his petition. 6' The court, however, characterized the ex post
facto and double jeopardy claims as the "linchpin" of the case, and dedi-
cated almost the entirety of its decision to assessing whether the Washing-
ton law was "punitive ... as applied to Young. ',6' After noting the similar-
54 Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744,751 (W.D. Wash. 1995).
55 Id. at 752. Central to the court's analysis was its conclusion that the law "plainly delays the
treatment that must constitutionally accompany commitment pursuant to the Statute. The failure of the
Statute to provide for examination or treatment prior to the completion of the punishment phase
strongl suggests that treatment is of secondary, rather than primary, concern." Id. at 753.
521 U.S. 346 (1997).
57 Id. at 369-71.
58 Young v. Weston, 122 F.3d 38 (9th Cir. 1997).
59 The allegations included the following:
* Young is subject to conditions more restrictive than those placed either on true civil
commitment detainees or even those placed on state prisoners;
* Young has been subject to such conditions for more than seven years;
The Special Commitment Center is located wholly within the perimeter of a larger
Department of Corrections facility;
The conditions of confinement at the Special Commitment Center are not compatible
with the Washington statute's treatment purposes;
* The conditions and restrictions at the Special Commitment Center are not reasonably
related to a legitimate non-punitive goal;
* Special Commitment Center residents were housed in units that were, according to
Special Master Janice Marques, "clearly inappropriate for individuals in a mental
health treatment program"; and
There were no certified sex-offender treatment providers at Special Commitment Cen-
ter.
In re Young, 192 F.3d 870, 875 (9th Cir. 1999).
60 Id. at 873.
61 Id. at 870.
6 2 Id. at 873.
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ity between the Washington and Kansas commitment laws, the Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded that any facial challenge was to no avail.63 However, the
court was at pains to emphasize that Hendricks did not involve an "as ap-
plied" challenge as such, and that both the majority and concurring opin-
ions in Hendricks insisted that the avowed civil purposes of the Kansas law
should not serve as a veil for actual punitive conditions of confinement.'
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit looked to the conditions of confinement
alleged by Young to assess whether the law's civil label was "divested" by
the "'clearest proof' that the statutory scheme [was] punitive in its 'ef-
fect."'" Employing this framework, the court concluded that Young "al-
leged sufficient facts that, if proved, would constitute such 'clear proof.'""
The court, however, remanded the matter to the trial court for an eviden-
tiary hearing because the state courts failed to provide Young with suffi-
cient opportunity to support his allegations.67
The Ninth Circuit ignored Young's substantive due process claim
sounding in improper confinement conditions. However, the court con-
cluded that the statutory requirements for commitment of "mental abnor-
mality" and "personality disorder" were not so vague as to violate due
process.6"
B. The Supreme Court's Decision in Young
The U.S. Supreme Court granted Washington State's petition for re-
view."' The sole question addressed by the Court was whether an "as ap-
plied" challenge based on ex post facto and double jeopardy grounds was
cognizable, requiring release.70 Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor
rejected the claim, offering several reasons. First, she noted that Washing-
ton's commitment law was "strikingly similar" to that of Kansas, which
only a few terms before in Hendricks the Court deemed "civil" for pur-
poses of ex post facto and double jeopardy analysis.7 Justice O'Connor
hastened to add that the Hendricks Court also considered the conditions of
63 Id. at 874.
64Id.
65 Id. (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997)).
66 Id.
67 Id. at 876. The court added that "Washington's refusal to allow Young to appear before any
court for four months-where those facing commitment under Washington's regular civil commitment
statute are entitled to a prompt probable cause heaing-may be an indicia of the statute's punitive
purpose or effect." Id. at 876-77.
68 See id. at 876 (noting that "while the statute's failure to limit its reach to whose who com-
pletely lack control may be an indicia of a forbidden deterrent purpose, this failure does not, by itself,
render the statute unconstitutional").
69 Seling v. Young, 529 U.S. 1017 (2000).
70 Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 262 (2001).
71 Id. at 260-62.
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confinement associated with the Kansas law at its origin, including the fact
that detainees were held in a segregated unit in the prison system and quite
possibly would be held without receiving treatment.72 Young's allegations
regarding conditions, Justice O'Connor concluded, were "in many respects
like the claims" rejected by the Court in Hendricks.3
The second reason advanced by Justice O'Connor was more novel.
This was that an "as applied" challenge to a statutory provision, previously
deemed non-punitive for ex post facto and double jeopardy purposes,
would "prove unworkable. 74 The Court stated that "[s]uch an analysis
would never conclusively resolve whether a particular scheme is punitive
and would thereby prevent a final determination of the scheme's validity
under the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses."" Justice
O'Connor explained:
Unlike a fine, confinement is not a fixed event .... [it ex-
tends over time under conditions that are subject to change.
The particular features of confinement may affect how a con-
finement scheme is evaluated to determine whether it is civil
rather than punitive, but it remains no less true that the query
must be answered definitively. The civil nature of a con-
finement scheme cannot be altered based merely on vagaries
in the implementation of the authorizing statute.76
Justice O'Connor added that the civil or punitive nature of a law is to be
determined on the basis of its text and legislative history, rather than the
effect the law might have on a given individual over the course of com-
mitment.77
In Young's case, despite his individualized claims of punitive con-
finement, the non-punitive character of the Washington law had been rec-
ognized twice before: By the Supreme Court of Washington7" and by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Hendricks when it construed Kansas' commitment
law.7 9 To allow an as applied challenge to the Washington law in the face
of this precedent would amount to an "end run," which the Young majority
would not abide."0 The Court concluded that "[a]n Act, found to be civil,
cannot be deemed punitive 'as applied' to a single individual in violation of
the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses and provide cause for re-
72 Id. at 261-62.
73 Id. at 262.
74 Id. at 263.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 262 (citing Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997)).
78 In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 998 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).
79 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 347, 369 (1997).
s0Young, 531 U.S. at 263-64.
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lease."'" In so concluding, however, the majority acknowledged that
"some of respondent's allegations are serious."82 Furthermore, the major-
ity expressly reserved judgment on "how [Young's] allegations would bear
on a court determining in the first instance whether Washington's confine-
ment scheme is civil.
83
Justice O'Connor concluded by noting that individuals such as Young
were not entirely without remedy. In particular, Washington statutory law
expressly provided that detainees enjoyed the right to adequate care and
individualized treatment, a right the state courts had recognized and were
charged with enforcing. 4 Moreover, both state and federal courts remain
empowered to adjudicate and remedy federal constitutional claims, correct-
ing unlawful conditions based on the precept that "due process requires
that the conditions and duration of confinement under the Act bear some
reasonable relation to the purpose for which persons are committed." 5 As
an example, the Court noted that a § 1983 claim had already succeeded in
securing an injunction requiring state authorities to adopt and implement a
plan making several treatment-related improvements. 6
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Souter, concurred in the result, and en-
dorsed the view that a law once deemed civil for double jeopardy and ex
post facto purposes cannot later be transformed into a punitive one because
of the way that it is implemented. 7 According to Justice Scalia:
The short of the matter is that, for Double Jeopardy and Ex
Post Facto Clause purposes, the question of criminal penalty
vel non depends upon the intent of the legislature; and harsh
executive implementation cannot "transfor[m] what was
clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty,"
any more than compassionate executive implementation can
transform a criminal penalty into a civil remedy.88
Justice Scalia flatly rejected, however, the majority's view that actual con-
ditions of confinement and implementation might have relevance to the
81 d. at 267.
82 Id. at 263.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 265 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.080(2) (1992)).
85 Id. (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 79 (1992); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,
324 (1982); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)).
86 Id. at 265-66.
87 Id. at 269.
88 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154 (1956))
(alteration in Young) (internal citation omitted). In a footnote, Justice Scalia added that because the Ex
Post Facto Clause expressly prohibits "pass[ing]" ex post facto laws, a limit on legislative action, "the
irrelevance of subsequent executive implementation to" assessing legislative intent "is, if anything,
even clearer." Id. at 269 n.*.
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analysis of whether a law is civil or criminal "in the first instance."89 To
Justice Scalia, this was not an open question, but rather one that had been
definitively resolved by the Court's decision in Hudson v. United States,"
which rejected a double jeopardy challenge to a fine authorized by a statute
the nature of which the courts had not yet evaluated, and eschewed consid-
eration of how the law had been "applied" to the petitioners.9
Like Justice O'Connor, however, Justice Scalia held out some hope for
relief in the event that a state failed to administer a facially civil statute in a
civil manner: Those targeted can "resort to the traditional state proceed-
ings that challenge unlawful executive action. ' Only where such pro-
ceedings are unsuccessful, "and the state courts authoritatively interpret the
state statute as permitting impositions that are indeed punitive, then and
only then can federal courts pronounce a statute that on its face is civil to
be criminal."93 In short, a committee must first petition state authorities to
remedy "whatever excess in administration contradicts the statute's civil
character."94 Only if state courts fail to cure such excesses will an ex post
facto or double jeopardy claim lie to invalidate a statute.95
According to Justice Scalia, such deference is consistent with the ab-
stention-based concerns implicated by federal oversight of state executive
action:
Such an approach protects federal courts from becoming en-
meshed in the sort of intrusive inquiry into local conditions at
state institutions that are best left to the State's own judiciary,
at least in the first instance. And it avoids federal invalida-
tion of state statutes on the basis of executive implementation
that the state courts themselves, given the opportunity, would
find to be ultra vires. Only this approach, it seems to me, is
in accord with our sound and traditional reluctance to be the
initial interpreter of state law.96
89 Id. at 267-68 (Scalia, J., concurring).
90 522 U.S. 93 (1997).
91 Young, 531 U.S. at 267-68 (Scalia, J., concurring).
92 Id. at 269 (Scalia, J., concurring).
93 Id. at 269-70 (Scalia, J., concurring).
94 Id. at 269 (Scalia, J., concurring).
95 Id. at 269-70 (Scalia, J., concurring).
96 Id. at 270 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496,
500-01 (1941)). Although beyond the scope of discussion here, Justice Scalia's paramount concern for
deference to state court decisions is unwarranted outside of the unique procedural posture of Young.
Generally, basic rules of procedure limit federal appellate review to issues presented to the lower court.
See CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., 12 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1394 (2d ed. 1987 &
Supp. 2000). Likewise, in the habeas context, doctrines of exhaustion and procedural default ensure
that state courts have the first opportunity to correct unconstitutional confinement. See 28 U.S.C. §
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Justice Thomas also concurred in the result, but voiced an even greater
aversion for analytic consideration of how a statute is implemented. At the
outset Justice Thomas criticized the majority for its characterization of
Young's claim as being an "as applied," as opposed to "facial," challenge.
According to Thomas, "[t]ypically an 'as applied' challenge is a claim that
a statute, 'by its own terms, infiinge[s] constitutional freedoms in the cir-
cumstances of [a] particular case."'"" Young's claim, Thomas reasoned,
was not that Washington's commitment law was unconstitutional "'by its
own terms' . . . as applied to him, but rather that the statute is not being
applied according to its terms at all."9'  According to Justice Thomas,
Young "essentially contend[ed] that the actual conditions of confinement,
notwithstanding the text of the statute, are punitive and incompatible with
the Act's treatment purpose." Therefore, similarly to Justice Scalia, Jus-
tice Thomas inferred that if a putatively civil statute is "not being applied
according to its terms, the conditions are not the effect of the statute, but
rather the effect of its improper implementation. ' ' 0°
Furthermore, to Justice Thomas, conditions have no relevance to dou-
ble jeopardy and ex post facto analysis, as evidenced in the Court's deci-
sion in Hudson.'0 ' Judicial determination of whether a statute is civil or
criminal is to be determined by examining the "statute on its face,"'02 with-
out consideration of how the statute has been implemented (in this case,
2254(b) (2000); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1973) (noting that exhaustion require-
ments give the state court "an opportunity to correct its own constitutional errors.").
Curiously, in Young the Supreme Court did not address either of these two threshold issues. The
Ninth Circuit found that Young had exhausted his claim by repeatedly attempting to present the claim
in state courts. The state courts refused to hear it, and the federal appellate court properly held that
"[tihe fact that the state courts refused to receive this evidence does not render Young's claim unex-
hausted." Young v. Weston, 192 F.3d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1999). But the Ninth Circuit did not address
the question of procedural default-whether Young had raised his conditions claim in the correct pro-
cedural posture. Young's habeas petition, amended years after his initial commitment, argued that
those years of substandard conditions rendered his confinement punitive. These as applied issues were
not before the Washington Supreme Court. See In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1005 (Wash. 1993) ("There
is no evidence in the record addressing either the actual conditions of confinement, or the quality of
treatment. These issues are not currently before the court."). Subsequently, in In re Turay, 986 P.2d
790 (Wash. 1999), the Washington Supreme Court made clear that as applied claims were procedurally
improper in initial commitment proceedings: "[Al person committed under RCW 71.09 may not chal-
lenge the actual conditions of their confinement, or the quality of the treatment at the DSHS facility
until they have been found to be an SVP and committed under the provisions of RCW 71.09." Turay,
986 P.2d at 803.
97 Young, 531 U.S. at 271 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Christian Echoes
Nat'l Ministry, Inc., 404 U.S. 561, 565 (1972)) (alteration and emphasis in Young).
98 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
99 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
too Id. at 273-74 (Thomas, J., concurring).
101 Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997).
102 Young, 531 U.S. at 272 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Hudson, 522 U.S. at 101).
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per the "actual conditions of confinement"). 10 3 Justice Thomas, like Justice
Scalia, also disagreed that conditions might have relevance in "first in-
stance" analysis. This was because Hudson bars judicial consideration of
implementation indicia "at any time," t 4 and consideration would be as
"unworkable" in the first instance as it would be later, because it would pin
a statute's survival on the "vagaries" of implementation at different times
and within different institutions. 10 5
The sole dissent was lodged by Justice Stevens, who vigorously chal-
lenged his colleagues' refusal to consider Young's allegations as to con-
finement conditions. While acknowledging that the civil/criminal nature of
a statute is "initially one of statutory construction,"'" Justice Stevens ar-
gued that conditions should play a role in the constitutional inquiry, regard-
less of whether the statute was initially deemed civil by a court. 0 7 "If con-
ditions of confinement are such that a detainee has been punished twice in
violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause, it is irrelevant that the scheme has
been previously labeled as civil without full knowledge of the effects of the
statute."' 08  To Justice Stevens, the majority mischaracterized Young's
claim as "whether an Act that is otherwise civil in nature can be deemed
criminal in a specific instance based on evidence of its application to a
particular prisoner."' 9  Rather, Young's allegations concerning the
"starkly punitive character of the conditions of his confinement,""a in
which he was not receiving adequate treatment, constituted evidence of the
punitive purpose and effect of Washington's commitment law."' As such,
the allegations raised concern that Washington was in fact pursuing a
criminal sanction, despite the nominally civil character of its law." 2
C. Questions Left Open By Young
Young is a rich decision, distinguished as much by what it left unre-
solved as what it seemingly resolved. To eight members of the Court, it is
clear that, for purposes of the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses,
the initial "civil" character of a statute cannot be rendered "criminal" by
the manner in which it is later implemented.' However, Justice
103 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
104 Id. at 273 (Thomas, J., concurring).
105 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
106 Id. at 276-77 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
107 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
108 Id. at 277 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109 Id. at 275 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
ItO Id. at 277 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
II Id. at 275 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
I2 Id. at 277 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
113 See discussion supra Part II.B.
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O'Connor's majority opinion for five members of the Court was at pains to
emphasize that other potential claims, in particular substantive due process,
were not implicated." 4  Indeed, the majority noted that a constitutional
challenge might arise from Washington's improper implementation of its
commitment law, which is "designed to incapacitate and to treat.""'  Cit-
ing several of the Court's prior substantive due process cases that have
dealt with involuntary civil commitment, the majority noted that "due pro-
cess requires that the conditions and duration of confinement under the Act
bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which persons are com-
mitted."' 16
The continued vitality of a substantive due process claim for commit-
tees such as Young is buttressed by the distinctiveness of due process, as
compared to the ex post facto and double jeopardy claims litigated in
Young. Ex post facto and double jeopardy are inherently ab initio, static
claims oriented to statutory analysis, which seek to prevent laws that pun-
ish retroactively (ex post facto) or punish twice (double jeopardy). They
turn onlegislative purpose and the "effects apparent upon the face of the
statute."" As the majority noted, substantive due process, by contrast,
requires at the very least an inquiry into whether a "reasonable relation"
exists between legislative purpose and its actual implementation (i.e.,
"conditions and duration" of commitment),"' and thus of necessity is "as
applied." If a court is to evaluate the relation it must look beyond the face
of any given statute, taking into account how the statute is implemented,
with due regard for constitutional doctrine."g Relatedly, a civil commit-
ment, although fully constitutional ab initio, becomes unconstitutional if
and when one of the constitutional bases justifying commitment disap-
pears.12
0
In sum, substantive due process is inherently more flexible, looking
less to statutory interpretation than to the real-world practicalities of a
114 See Young, 531 U.S. at 266 (noting that "[t]his case gives us no occasion to consider how the
civil nature of a confinement scheme relates to other constitutional challenges, such as due process").
Id. at 265.
116 Id. (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 79 (1992); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,
324 (1982); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)).
7 Id. at 269 (Scalia, J., concurring).
118 Id. at 265. See also infra notes 221-226 and accompanying text.
119 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL. L. REV. 297,
368 (1997) (urging that constitutional interpretation "be flexible, recognizing that different constitu-
tional provisions are based on different principles and therefore impose distinct limitations on govern-
ment action"); Wayne A. Logan, The Ex Post Facto Clause and the Jurisprudence ofPunishment, 35
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1261, 1286-87 (1998) (surveying decisions by the Court placing "heavy emphasis"
on functional role played by particular constitutional provisions).
120 See infra notes 227-247 and accompanying text.
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law's application to detainees before the court. 12' Although this fluidity
can make the system less "workable," requiring judicial review of post-
confinement decisions, with concomitant separation of powers concerns,'
22
the open-ended approach is compelled by the peculiar commands of sub-
stantive due process, which operates as a constitutional check on the appli-
cation of laws threatening unjustified deprivations of liberty. 23  In short,
Young does nothing to undercut the viability of an as applied substantive
due process claim, the contours of which are addressed at length later in
this Article.
Another basic question left unanswered by Young is the scope of reme-
dies available to committees such as Andre Young. Justice O'Connor's
majority opinion stressed that Young was not bereft of remedy. He could
sue to ensure enforcement of a state statutory right to adequate care and
individualized treatment and to vindicate his due process right that "the
conditions and duration of [his] confinement . . . bear some reasonable
relation" to the putative purpose of that confinement. 124 Justice O'Connor
made equally clear, however, that Young's particular habeas petition-a
writ that normally affords release as a remedy12--did not warrant his re-
121 As Professor Richard Fallon has noted, "[s]ome doctrinal tests call for statutes to be tested on
their faces, whereas others do not. Accordingly, debates about the permissibility of facial challenges
should be recast as debates about the substantive tests that should be applied to enforce particular
constitutional provisions." Richard L. Fallon, Jr., As Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party
Standing, 113 HARv. L. REV. 1321, 1321 (2000).
The debate over the distinction between facial and applied challenges has raged among courts and
commentators for years. Id. (noting debate and asserting that "[t]o a large extent, this debate reflects
mistaken assumptions. There is no single distinctive category of facial, as opposed to as applied, litiga-
tion. All challenges to statutes arise when a litigant claims that a statute cannot be enforced against
her."); see also Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV.
235, 294 (1994) (asserting that "[t]he distinction between as applied and facial challenges may confuse
more than it illuminates. In some sense, any constitutional challenge to a statute is both as applied and
facial.").
122 See generally Todd W. Wyatt, Double Jeopardy and Punishment: Why an As Applied Ap-
proach, As Applied to Separation of Powers Doctrines, Is Unconstitutional, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
107 (2000) (noting possible separation of powers concerns).
123 As the Seventh Circuit observed with respect to a first-generation SVP law: "All too often the
'promise of treatment has served only to bring an illusion of benevolence to what is essentially a ware-
housing operation for social misfits.' It is well settled that realities rather than benign motives or non-
criminal labels determine the relevance of constitutional policies." Stachulak v. Coughlin, 520 F.2d
931, 936 (7th Cir. 1975) (quoting Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1969)); see also
People v. McDougle, 708 N.E.2d 482, 488 (111. Ct. App. 1999) (stating that courts have authority to
review treatment given SVPs because "without the power of review, there is no way to guarantee that
the defendant will receive any treatment from the [department of corrections]").
124 Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265 (2001).
125 See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490 (1973) ("[H]abeas corpus is the appropriate rem-
edy for state prisoners attaching the validity of the fact or length of their confinement.").
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lease, at least insofar as it was premised on the Ex Post Facto and Double
Jeopardy Clauses. 26 It remains an open question whether this same result
would obtain if a substantive due process claim were to be brought by a
habeas petitioner similar to Young in the future-the question to which we
now turn.
III. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND INVOLUNTARY CIVIL
COMMITMENT
A. Introduction
The Supreme Court's substantive due process jurisprudence is guided
by an equation of sorts when it comes to evaluating state involuntary civil
commitment regimes. As a threshold matter, due process limits the pur-
poses that a state can seek to promote through the auspices of civil com-
mitment. In turn, the nature or conditions and duration of commitment
must "[ait the least ... bear some reasonable relation" to the espoused pur-
pose of commitment. 27 Despite the clarity of the equation, over the years
the Court has sent conflicting signals on the contours of permissible gov-
ernment purpose, and, indeed, on the corollary measures of na-
ture/condition and duration. This section surveys the Court's relevant civil
commitment decisions to lay the foundation for our argument, in the next
section, that there exists an enforceable right to effective treatment.
Our discussion will be assisted by a preliminary distinction. Civil
commitment can be divided into two relatively distinct sub-types based on
two broad justifications-parens patriae and police power. When the gov-
ernment acts in a parens patriae capacity it seeks to preserve the health and
well-being of disabled individuals, "providing care to its citizens who are
unable because of emotional disorders to care for themselves.' ' 28 By con-
trast, the government exercises its police power authority, such as with
SVP laws, 129 in the name of societal self-protection; the government seeks
to "protect the community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are
mentally ill."'' 0 Courts and commentators agree that the two forms of civil
126 See Young, 531 U.S. at 267 ( "An Act, found to be civil, cannot be deemed punitive 'as ap-
plied' to a single individual in violation of the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses and provide
cause for release.").127 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
128Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979).
129 See Eric S. Janus, Hendricks and the Moral Terrain of Police Power Civil Commitment, 4
PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y, & L. 297, 302 (1998) (noting that Hendricks in particular relied exclusively on
police power authority).
Id. at 303.
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commitment are analytically separate."' Although our focus is on police
power commitments, a full understanding of the due process implications
of effective treatment requires references to both rationales for commit-
ment.
B. The Case Law
The Court has set some clear substantive due process limits on the
states' authority to civilly commit. The first limit relates to the purposes a
state may pursue. The other three limits are derivative of, and serve, that
limit. They pertain to conditions of the detainee (dangerousness and men-
tal disorder), duration of confinement, and conditions of confinement (in-
cluding treatment).
1. Purposes of Confinement
Since 1975, the Court has insisted that only certain governmental pur-
poses suffice, for substantive due process purposes, to justify involuntary
civil commitment. In O'Connor v. Donaldson,'32 arguably its seminal de-
cision on parens patriae authority, the Court considered the constitutional-
ity of the involuntary commitment of a person deemed mentally ill but
dangerous neither to himself nor others, in a facility that offered no mental
health treatment.133 Decided at a time when the nation was critically reex-
amining the propriety of warehousing mentally ill yet non-dangerous per-
sons, Donaldson clarified the permissible bounds of parens patriae-based
commitments. The Court stated that permissible state goals in parens pa-
triae commitments were limited "to prevent[ing] injury to the public, to
ensur[ing] [the individual's] survival or safety, or to alleviat[ing] or
cur[ing] his illness.' 34 Concurring, Chief Justice Burger characterized the
states' purpose in parens patriae commitments as "the duty to protect 'per-
sons under legal disabilities to act for themselves. "" '35
The Court has been equally clear that substantive due process imposes
limits on police power civil commitment authority. Two central limiting
principles have emerged: First, as the Court has repeatedly made clear,
civil commitment cannot be punitive in purpose. In Jones v. United
States,136 for instance, the Court addressed the limits of state authority to
131See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 583 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (noting
that "the use of alternative forms of protection may be motivated by different considerations, and the
justifications for one may not be invoked to rationalize another").
132 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
133Id. at 573.
134Id. at 573-74.
135Id. at 583 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (quoting Hawaii v. Stamford Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257
(1972)
136 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
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hold those adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity.'37 The Court ob-
served that a state "may punish a person convicted of a crime even if satis-
fied that he is unlikely to commit further crimes.1 38 Moreover, "[d]ifferent
considerations underlie commitment of an insanity acquitee. As he was not
convicted, he may not be punished." a9 Likewise, in Foucha v. Louisi-
ana,1 40 the Court addressed a Louisiana law that permitted the continued
confinement of an insanity acquitee, who, although no longer "mentally
ill," continued to be held because he was "dangerous.'' The Court ob-
served, again, that the State is empowered to imprison individuals pursuant
to its police power-"for the purposes of deterrence and retribution.' 42
Foucha, however, "was not convicted, [and therefore] he may not be pun-
ished."'43
Second, and closely related, civil commitment must not threaten the
primacy of the criminal law as the tool for addressing antisocial behavior.
The Court expressed this principle in Foucha, holding that Louisiana could
not continue to civilly confine an insanity acquitee who was no longer
mentally ill because it had not "explain[ed] why its interest would not be
vindicated by the ordinary criminal processes involving charge and convic-
tion.' 44 Likewise, in Kansas v. Crane,45 where the Court revisited its due
process judgment in Kansas v. Hendricks46 regarding the Kansas SVP law,
the Court emphasized that
the constitutional importance of distinguishing a dangerous
sexual offender subject to civil commitment "from other dan-
gerous persons who are perhaps more properly dealt with ex-
clusively through criminal proceedings." That distinction is
necessary lest "civil commitment" become a "mechanism for
retribution or deterrence"-functions properly those of
criminal law, not civil commitment.
47
2. Conditions of the Detainee
The Court's numerous due process decisions have also attached impor-
1371d. at 356.
138 Id. at 369.
139 Id.
140 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
141 Id. at 73.
142 Id. at 80.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 82.
145 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
146 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
147 Crane, 534 U.S. at 412 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360, 372-73 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring)).
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tance to the mental condition of individuals involuntarily committed, both
at the time of initial commitment and thereafter. In Donaldson,14 the ma-
jority concluded that it was constitutionally impermissible for Florida to
commit, and continue to confine, a "harmless mentally ill" individual. 149
The Court stated that "[a] finding of 'mental illness' alone cannot justify a
State's locking a person up against his will and keeping him indefinitely in
simple custodial confinement."' 5 ° Concurring, Chief Justice Burger stated
that "[a]t a minimum, a particular scheme for protection of the mentally ill
must rest upon a legislative determination that it is compatible with the best
interests of the affected class and that its members are unable to act for
themselves."'' In short, for parens patriae purposes, states must operate
in the "best interests" of the individual, and therefore can involuntarily
commit only persons who are mentally impaired (in the sense of being in-
competent to care for themselves) and dangerous (in the sense that they
will suffer or cause physical harm to others in the absence of interven-
tion).152
Similarly, in police power commitments substantive due process re-
quires that a committee be both dangerous and suffer from a mental im-
pairment of some type. 153 However, as will be made clear later, mental
impairment must represent something other than incompetence in the po-
lice power context.
I1 4
3. Duration of Confinement
Another central limit on the states' commitment authority is the princi-
ple that the duration of a civil commitment must be related to its purpose.
That is, regardless of the validity of the initial judgment of commitment,
confinement must end when its justification expires. In the parens patriae
context, this principle is illustrated by Donaldson, which stated that it is
"[not] enough that Donaldson's original confinement was founded upon a
constitutionally adequate basis, if in fact it was, because even if his invol-
untary confinement was initially permissible, it could not constitutionally
148 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
149 Id. at 574.
350 Id. at 575; see also id. at 576 (asserting that "a State cannot constitutionally confine without
more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the
help of willing and responsible family members or friends").
151 Id. at 583.
152 For a fuller treatment ofparenspatriae, see JOHN Q. LAFOND & MARY L. DURHAM, BACK TO
THE ASYLUM: THE FUTURE OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW AND POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 25-34
(1992); BARBARA A. WEINER & ROBERT W. WETrSTEIN, LEGAL ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH CARE 47,
111-12 (1993).
153See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 409-10 (2002); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358
(1997); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71,77 (1992).
154See infra notes 206-211 and accompanying text.
continue after that basis no longer existed."'
The principle is equally at play in the police power context. In 1972,
in Jackson v. Indiana, 5 6 the Court addressed the power of the state to hold
for an indefinite period of time an individual, prior to criminal trial, due to
mental incompetency. The Court ordered his release from confinement,
holding that "due process requires that the nature and duration of commit-
ment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual
is committed."' 57 Applying this principle in Foucha, the Court ordered the
release of an insanity acquitee who, while ostensibly still dangerous, was
no longer mentally ill.
58
4. Conditions of Confinement, Parens Patriae, and the Right to
Treatment
Having explored the basic due process limits associated with the two
major rationales of civil commitment, we now turn to the right to treat-
ment, restricting our discussion in this subsection to parens patriae. We
do so in order to set the stage for our central concern, namely the right to
treatment in police power commitments.
The Court's parens patriae cases have approached the right to treat-
ment in two ways. First, and most fundamentally, the basic logic of the
parens patriae authority entails an implicit expectation of beneficial treat-
ment, most often serving as the factor that explains why loss of liberty is in
the individual's "best interests."'' 59 Of course, there might be rare instances
in which the individual's "survival or safety" is so endangered that custo-
dial confinement, standing alone without treatment, would be thought in
the committee's best interest.160 For most mentally impaired individuals,
however, the massive loss of liberty associated with involuntary civil con-
finement is in their best interests only when it is necessary for an effective
course of treatment.
Youngberg v. Romeo 6' establishes a second substantive due process
derivation of the right to treatment. Youngberg concerned the responsibil-
ity of government in the care of a "profoundly retarded" adult, who lacked
155 Donaldson, 422 U.S. at 574-75.
156 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
157Id. at 738.
159 Foucha, 504 U.S. at 83.
159 See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979) (suggesting that institutionalization is
in the interests of"a genuinely mentally ill person ... suffering from a debilitating mental illness and in
need of treatment").
160 Donaldson, 422 U.S. at 584 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (acknowledging that there are persons
who "are unable to function in society and will suffer real harm to themselves unless provided with
care in a sheltered environment" and stating that government must reserve the right to institutionalize
persons with mental illnesses for which "no effective therapy has yet been discovered").
161 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
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the "most basic self-care skills," and was prone to injure himself, and as a
result was involuntarily committed. 6 2 The petitioner alleged that despite
having been afforded due process by the state in its commitment proce-
dures, he retained certain "liberty interests," in particular, to be cared for in
a safe manner and a right to be free from undue bodily restraint.'63
In responding to the challenge, the Court framed the issue as one re-
quiring it to discern the proper standard for balancing an "individual's lib-
erty interest against the State's legitimate interests in confinement.""' It
emphasized that civil committees such as Romeo, who was neither charged
with nor convicted of a crime, are entitled to "more considerate treatment
and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of con-
finement are designed to punish."'65 However, in assessing the fit between
the avowed civil purpose and the means chosen by the state, the applicable
"standard is lower than the 'compelling' or 'substantial' necessity tests"
because those standards "would place an undue burden on the administra-
tion of institutions."'66 Further, in determining what is "reasonable," courts
"must show deference to the judgment exercised by a qualified profes-
sional."'67 This ensures the minimization of "interference by the federal
judiciary with the internal operations of these institutions." '68
Taken together, these considerations dictate that significant deference
be shown state authorities. However, the deference is not without limit. In
particular, "[i]t may well be unreasonable not to provide training when
training could significantly reduce the need for restraints or the likelihood
of violence," '69 with such training being consistent with what "an appropri-
ate professional would consider reasonable." ' Romeo thus enjoyed "con-
stitutionally protected interests in conditions of reasonable care and safety,
reasonably nonrestrictive confinement conditions, and such training as may
be required by these interests. Such conditions of confinement would
comport fully with the purpose of [Romeo's] commitment."'' The Court,
as a consequence, identified a residuum of "liberty interests . . . that invol-
untary commitment proceedings do not extinguish."'1 2 According to the
Court, "[t]he mere fact that Romeo has been committed under proper pro-
cedures does not deprive him of all substantive liberty interests under the
162 Id. at 309-10.
163 Id. at 315.
164 Id. at 321 n.28 (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 431-32).
165 Id. at 321-22.
166 Id. at 322.
167 Id.
168 Id. (footnote omitted).
169 Id. at 324.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 315.
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Fourteenth Amendment."' 173
Youngberg thus required the Court to identify two things: First, a core
area of liberty that states are not permitted to invade in civil commitment
("residual liberty"); second, an affirmative obligation that operates on gov-
ernment to enhance and protect that liberty-not merely avoid infringing
it-when depriving a person of physical liberty. 174 In Youngberg, the lib-
erty at stake was the most elemental kind of freedom-freedom from "un-
reasonable bodily restraints."'' 75  Because the petitioner was severely re-
tarded, and seemingly without the ability to live in the community, the
Court did not feel the need to address the further question of whether the
residual liberty interest includes a post-commitment freedom from con-
straint altogether. But the implication seems clear that this liberty entails
some quantum of post-commitment freedom. 176  If so, the logic of Young-
berg requires that the government affirmatively enhance that interest 17
7
through the provision of treatment17 1 that enables committees to recover
sufficiently to enjoy post-commitment ("residual") liberty.
173 d. As pointed out in Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion (joined by Justices Brennan and
O'Connor), the majority's decision left "unresolved two difficult and important issues." Id. at 325
(Blackmun, J., concurring). The first was whether the state could commit a person for "care and treat-
ment" and then "constitutionally refuse to provide him any 'treatment,' as that term is defined by state
law." Id. Blackmun argued that if a state commits a person for "care and treatment," "commitment
without any 'treatment' whatsoever would not bear a reasonable relation to the purposes of the person's
confinement." Id. at 325-26. But Blackmun also wrote that if a state commits a person for "safekeep-
ing," it may then "constitutionally refuse to provide him treatment." Id. at 326. Our approach to the
right to treatment avoids conditioning the right to treatment on the contingency of the state's articula-
tion ofpurpose.
174 Id. at 319 (recognizing that the "respondent's liberty interests require the State to provide
minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint").
175ld. at 327. The Court noted that Romeo's "primary needs are bodily safety and a minimum of
physical restraint"--which it has recognized as "constitutionally protected liberty interest[s]"--and that
"training may be necessary to avoid unconstitutional infringement of those rights." Id. at 317-18.
176See also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990) (holding that a mentally ill inmate
has a "significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs").
177 The literature asserting the existence of a constitutional right to treatment for civil committees
is well-developed and large. See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, 2 MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CRIMI-
NAL AND CIVIL §§ 3A-1 to 3A-15 (1999 & Supp. 2001). Although addressing a claim brought under
federal statutory law, the Court's recent decision in Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999), held that
the state has an affirmative obligation to find community placements for disabled individuals, not
merely house them in institutions. Id. at 597. Olmstead has been interpreted to further substantiate the
right to treatment. See Mary C. Cerreto, Olmstead: The Brown v. Board of Education for Disability
Rights: Promises, Limits, and Issues, 3 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 47, 65-66 (2001).
178 Although Youngberg referred to treatment as "training," with particular regard to the retarded,
courts have subsequently equated such training with the provision of treatment to the mentally ill. See,
e.g., Woe v. Cuomo, 729 F.2d 96, 104-07 (2d Cir. 1984) (interpreting Youngberg to support a right to
treatment).
179 Cf Alexander S. v. Boyd, 876 F. Supp. 773, 790 (D. S.C. 1995) (holding that "[u]nder the
Constitution, a minimally adequate level of [correctional] programming is required in order to provide
juveniles with a reasonable opportunity to accomplish the purpose of their confinement"); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 253B.03(7) (West 1998) (providing that persons under mental health commitment have "the
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The discussion thus far has identified two treatment rights of divergent
shapes on the basis of the Court's parens patriae jurisprudence. In the first
formulation (Donaldson), treatment-benefit is most often a precondition for
"best interests" commitment, and, in those circumstances, the absence of
the treatment-benefit would mandate release. In rare instances, however,
commitment would be justifiable without treatment because it satisfies the
"best interests" calculus.180 In contrast, as its facts make clear, Youngberg
requires treatment even if the commitment itself is justifiable for pure cus-
todial reasons. However, because Youngberg is satisfied by proof of com-
pliance with professional standards,' it entails no necessary guarantee of
efficacy or amenability to treatment. 82 Finally, the Youngberg right to
treatment is not directly derived from the state's justifications for commit-
ment, but rather from an analysis of the ("residual") liberty interest that
remains despite the commitment. Thus, unlike the "best interests" deriva-
tion for the right to treatment expectancy (Donaldson), it is not clear that a
failure of the state to comply with Youngberg would render the commit-
ment itself unconstitutional.
Police power commitments, although they have an avowedly different
purpose, clearly also entail a right to treatment. Like parens patriae, the
police power-derived right to treatment assumes a handful of different
forms. In the next Part, we argue that the Court's police power jurispru-
dence entails a strong right to effective treatment, constitutionally enforce-
able by means of the remedy of release.
IV. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
TREATMENT IN POLICE POWER COMMITMENTS
Upon initial consideration, the states' police power, which permits
commitments in the name of societal self-protection, would appear to lack
an enforceable right to treatment. This is because, by its own logic, the
power applies to all dangerous persons-targeting both mentally disor-
dered dangerous persons and those whose dangerousness arises from greed,
callousness or simple evil.'83 Under this view, the police power might
right to receive proper care and treatment, best adapted, according to contemporary professional stan-
dards, to rendering further supervision unnecessary").
180 See supra notes 164-173 and accompanying text.
181 See supra Aotes 166-167 and accompanying text.
182 After all, mere professional involvement in the design of treatment and the care provided is no
guarantee of effectiveness. See Polizzi et al., supra note 28, at 362 (noting the existence of failures
(recidivism) in all studied treatment programs).
183 Indeed, just such a view was expressed in 1975 by Chief Justice Burger in Donaldson, where
he opined in his concurrence that "[tlhere can be little doubt that in the exercise of its police power a
State may confine individuals solely to protect society from the dangers of significant antisocial acts or
communicable disease." O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 582-83 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concur-
ring). For an argument supporting such a "jurisprudence of prevention," see Edward P. Richards, The
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readily justify incapacitation of dangerous persons who either do not re-
ceive treatment or, in practical terms, are not amenable to it. Language in
Hendricks and Young could be taken to support this expansive view of po-
lice power, stating that "not all mental conditions [are] treatable. For those
individuals with untreatable conditions . . . there [is] no federal constitu-
tional bar to their civil confinement, because the State [has] an interest in
protecting the public from dangerous individuals with treatable as well as
untreatable conditions."'184
As clear as these pronouncements are, we argue that they are wrong, or
at least incomplete." 5 Hendricks and Young addressed facial challenges to
SVP statutes, and thus the Court was not asked whether the ongoing com-
mitment of dangerous individuals not amenable to treatment comports with
substantive due process. Moreover, in Hendricks, which served as the ba-
sis for the non-amenability statement, the Court attached importance to the
State's assertion that the Kansas law intended to treat Hendricks, and that
he was in fact receiving treatment, a linchpin of its analysis of whether the
law was punitive for ex post facto and double jeopardy purposes.'86 As
Justice Breyer noted in his dissent, the majority had no occasion to decide
whether due process "forbid[s] civil commitment of an untreatable men-
tally ill, dangerous person.' I87
In short, the states are not allowed to invoke police power free of the
right to treatment. As discussed in this Part, police power commitments
entail a right to treatment, which assumes three forms of varied strengths:
(1) treatment serving as a basis to maintain the necessary boundary be-
tween "civil" commitment and criminal confinement; (2) treatment protect-
ing the "residual" liberty that endures despite commitment; and (3)
Jurisprudence of Prevention: The Right of Societal Self-Defense Against Dangerous Individuals, 16
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 329 (1989).
184Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 262 (2001) (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 366
(1997)). This view, it bears mention, has been embraced by courts in California and Wisconsin as well.
See Hubbart v. Superior Court, 969 P.2d 584, 602 (Cal. 1999) (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 366)(alteration in Hubbart) (stating that Hendricks "strongly suggests that there is no broad constitutional
right of treatment for persons involuntarily confined as dangerous and mentally impaired, at least where
'no acceptable treatment exist[sl' or where they cannot be 'successfully treated for their afflictions"');
State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, 124 (Wis. 1995) (stating that precedent "does not necessarily equate
with a constitutional requirement that commitment be based on amenability to treatment nor even on a
constitutional right to treatment").
195 Below we acknowledge that there is an important grain of truth in the Court's statements
regarding amenability to treatment: Given the state of the art of sex offender treatment, a pre-
commitment amenability to treatment requirement would be unworkable, since there is simply no way
to distinguish, in advance, sex offenders who will, from those who will not, benefit from treatment.
Our formulation addresses an issue never addressed by the Court: Whether the Constitution places a
limit on the duration of confinement in the absence of effective treatment. See discussion infra Part
IV.C.
t86 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 368 n.5 (1997).
187 Id. at 378 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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treatment supporting the bedrock due process requirement that continued
commitment be reasonably related to its redemptive civil purpose, treat-
ment.
A. Treatment as Manifestation of Non-Punitive State Intent
The weakest form of the police power right to treatment derives from
two central limiting principles. First, civil commitment cannot be punitive
in purpose or effect (the "no-punishment" principle).," Second, and
closely related, civil commitment must not threaten the primacy of the
criminal law as the tool for addressing antisocial behavior (the "distinct
intervention" principle). 8 9
The "no punishment" principle emanates directly from the central
command that "civil" commitment not be "punitive.""'9 To ensure compli-
ance with this command, the Court has historically employed the test first
enunciated in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,'9 where the Court invali-
dated a federal law because it deprived an individual of citizenship as pun-
ishment, but did so without providing the strict procedural protections of
the criminal law.' The Court identified a variety of factors to be consid-
ered in judging whether a non-criminal sanction betrays a forbidden puni-
tive purpose. Two of those factors are especially relevant here:
"[W]hether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected
is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alter-
native purpose assigned."'193
The Court applied these criteria in Bell v. Wolfish, 94 in the context of
pre-trial detention of criminal defendants, a case relevant here because it
sought to identify the "distinction between punitive measures that may not
constitutionally be imposed prior to a determination of guilt and regulatory
restraints that may."'95 The Court identified the no-punishment principle as
the primary tool for analyzing a substantive due process challenge in such
circumstances.' 96 Because Bell had not been convicted of a crime, and the
government evinced no express intent to punish him, the constitutionality
of detention turned on "whether an alternative purpose to which [the re-
striction] may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it
188 See supra notes 132-43 and accompanying text.
189 See supra notes 144.47 and accompanying text.
190 See supra notes 13243 and accompanying text.
191372 U.S. 144 (1963).
192Id. at 183-84.
193 Id. at 168-69.
194 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
195 Id. at 537.
196 Id. at 535.
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appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned [to it].' 97
The "alternative purpose" in civil commitment (in addition to incapaci-
tation) is treatment."' Treatment is the alternate purpose the state must
pursue to establish the bona fides of its non-punitive commitment regime.
For instance, in Allen v. Illinois,'" the Court addressed a "first generation"
SVP law (the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act), and emphasized
that "the State serves its purpose of treating rather than punishing sexually
dangerous persons by committing them to an institution expressly designed
to provide psychiatric care and treatment. ''2"u Hendricks is quite consistent
with this view,"' and lower courts consistently cite "treatment" as the pur-
pose that redeems the constitutionality of SVP laws.2" 2
Similarly, the "distinct intervention" principle supports a right to
treatment in the police power context, albeit more indirectly. Applying this
principle, the Court in Foucha, Hendricks, and Crane imposed on states the
burden to justify their departure from the normal "charge and conviction"
methods of the criminal law. A key marker of the putative satisfaction of
this requirement is the statutory requirement of a mental impairment. In
Foucha, the Court made clear that "mental illness" (along with dangerous-
ness) was a constitutional predicate for police power civil commitments.2"3
Justice O'Connor, who in concurring provided the key fifth vote for the
majority in Foucha, averred that involuntary civil commitments must have
a "medical justification. '"" Otherwise, she concluded, "the necessary con-
nection between the nature and purposes of confinement would be ab-
197 Id. at 538 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)) (alteration
in Wo rlsh).
See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983) ("The purpose of commitment... is to
treat the individual's mental illness and protect him and society from his potential for dangerousness.").
1" 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
200 Id. at 373.
201 See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 366-67 (1997) (attaching importance to the fact that
treatment was an "ancillary goal" of the Kansas SVP law and noting the state's corresponding "obliga-
tion to provide treatment for committed persons"); see also id. at 371 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (de-
nominating the absence of treatment as an "indication of the forbidden purpose to punish"); id. at 383
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (asserting that a "statutory scheme that provides confinement that does not
reasonably fit a practically available, medically oriented treatment objective, more likely reflects a
primarily punitive legislative purpose").
2V See, e.g., In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 916 (Minn. 1994) ("So long as civil commitment is
programmed to provide treatment and periodic review, due process is provided."); State v. Post, 541
N.W.2d 115, 128 (Wis. 1995) (holding that treatment for paraphilias provides the "medical justifica-
tion" for Wisconsin's SVP law); West v. Macht, 614 N.W.2d 34, 40 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000) ("To be
lawful, the restriction on the involuntarily committee's constitutional rights must be reasonably related
to legitimate therapeutic and institutional interests."); see also Ohlinger v. Watson, 652 F.2d 775, 777-
78 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding, with respect to sex offenders incarcerated under a "rehabilitative rationale,"
that "[aldequate and effective treatment is constitutionally required because, absent treatment, appel-
lants could be held indefinitely....").
203 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80-81 (1992).
204 Id. at 88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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sent."205
In Hendricks, while the Court disavowed the necessity of a "mental ill-
ness" requirement per se, instead condoning the statutory criterion of
"mental abnormality,"2 °6 the Court insisted that the Kansas SVP law em-
ploy some mental impairment requirement. This was necessary for due
process purposes insofar as the requirement served to "adequately distin-
guish[] Hendricks from other dangerous persons who are perhaps more
properly dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings.9
207
This same concern was evidenced in Crane. 8 In refining the mental
impairment requirement, the Crane Court emphasized its crucial role in
"distinguishing" police power commitments from criminal confinements, a
distinction "necessary lest 'civil commitment' become[s] a 'mechanism for
retribution or general deterrence'-functions properly those of criminal
law, not civil commitment. '"2" Describing the required mental impairment
alternately as "a special and serious lack of ability to control behavior,"
and "proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior,, 210 the Court stated
that the requirement served to "distinguish the dangerous sexual offender
whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil
commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordi-
nary criminal case."'2 '
In sum, the requirement that SVP committees have a mental impair-
ment serves to substantiate the police power right to treatment. A treat-
ment purpose in itself, of course, does not signify that confinement is
"civil," given that penal servitude has been known to involve a treatment
component. 2 2  However, to the extent that "treatment" is shorthand for
"treatment for a mental impairment," it has stronger distinguishing powers,
because such treatment traditionally characterizes civil commitment. A]-
205 Id.
206 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358-59.
207 Id. at 360.
208 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 409 (2002).
209 Id. at 412 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 372-73 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
210 Id. at 413.
211 Id.
212 Prison programs often have "correctional treatment" aimed at the criminal behavior of con-
victs, and "rehabilitation" has for decades served as a core goal of penal confinement. See, e.g, Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 (1974) (holding that "[a] paramount objective of the corrections system is
the rehabilitation of those committed to its custody"). Further, some states have quite frankly used
penal confinement as a form of treatment. See, e.g., In re Maddox, 88 N.W.2d 470, 474 (Mich. 1958)
("In effect, the doctors' testimony really stated that incarceration in prison under prison conditions was
a medical prescription for the type of problems which defendant had been found to have."); see also
John W. Parry, Shrinking Civil Rights of Alleged Sexually Violent Predators, 25 MENTAL & PHYS.
DISABILITY L. REP. 318, 322-23 (2001) (noting that thirty-five jurisdictions permit imposition of treat-
ment on sex offenders during or after prison); cf Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the
Drug Treatment Court Movement, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1205 (1998) (discussing drug treatment courts,
which meld "substance abuse treatment and punishment").
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though there are several possible reasons underlying the Court's mental
impairment predicate," 3 the clearest way in which the presence of a mental
impairment serves to distinguish civil from criminal confinement is by
invoking a "medical justification"-the provision of treatment.
Thus far we have identified the first of three potential sources of the
right to treatment in police power commitments. It is important to note that
this first right is rather weak in origin and application, entailing no re-
quirement of efficacy or treatment amenability. This is because treatment
serves merely as an indication of the "bona fides" of the state's non-
punitive intent; therefore, a sufficiently strong treatment effort, even
though inefficacious for some detainees, might negate an inference of puni-
tive intent with regard to the statutory regime as a whole.21"
B. Youngberg and Police Power
The second police power incarnation of the right to treatment entails a
straightforward application of Youngberg, which, although a parens pa-
triae case, has been applied in the police power context.215  Most courts
interpret Youngberg as imposing a "professional standards" test.2" 6 Some
courts, however, interpret Youngberg as also requiring that treatment entail
methods that provide "a realistic opportunity to be cured or improve the
mental condition for which they were confined. 217
Taken together, these two formulations of Youngberg demarcate a
213 See Eric S. Janus, Foreshadowing the Future of Kansas v. Hendricks: Lessons From Minne-
sota 's Sex Offender Commitment Litigation, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 1279, 1291 (1998) (enumerating and
critiquing various roles for the "mental disorder" predicate in civil commitment).
214 Indeed, in many cases, the mere articulation of the intention to provide treatment has sufficed
to negate any inference of a forbidden punitive purpose. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346,
368 (1997) (stating that it is sufficient that state has "recommended treatment if such is possible");
Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369 (1986) (noting that "the State has a statutory obligation to provide
'care and treatment for...[SVPs] designed to effect recovery'); In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 997 (Wash.
1993) (holding that "the State had a statutory obligation to provide care and treatment designed to
effect recovery for those committed").
Of course, this "would if it could" theory cannot justify commitments for mental disorders that
are inherently unamenable to treatment. That argument has no real practical application, however,
since there is no certainty, ab initio, whether a specific condition will respond to some potential treat-
ment.
215 The Court, for instance, invoked Youngberg in both Hendricks and Young. See Seling v.
Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265 (2001); Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 368 n.4.
16 See, e.g., Bailey v. Gardebring, 940 F.2d 1150, 1154 (8th Cir. 1991); Thielman v. Leean, 140
F. Supp. 2d 982, 989-90 (W.D. Wis. 2001); West v. Macht, 614 N.W.2d 34, 39-40 (Wis. Ct. App.
2000). For discussion of the parameters of the standard more generally, see Susan Stefan, Leaving
Civil Rights to the "Experts": From Deference to Abdication Under the Professional Judgment Stan-
dard, 102 YALE L.J. 639 (1992).
217 Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2000). Authoritative formulations of"profes-
sional standards" for SVP treatment programs echo this requirement. See, e.g., JANICE MARQUES,
PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS FOR CIVIL COMMITMENT PROGRAMS 2-15 (2001) (asserting that the treat-
ment program must consider the viability of rehabilitation).
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more substantive right to treatment than that discussed above. However,
despite the added strength, the Youngberg formulation does not guarantee
individual treatment efficacy. Given the self-acknowledged limits of even
state-of-the-art sex offender treatment, 18 the "professional standards" test
is no guarantee of efficacy. In contrast, the "realistic opportunity to be
cured" view would appear to have some bite, especially given the meager
release rates of SVP regimes: 19 Nonetheless, even application of this latter
standard might justify indefinite confinement of a large proportion of
committees. This is because "realistic opportunity" is derived from an
aggregate measure, based on group performance, and for that reason does
not guarantee treatment success for any given individual.
C. The "Duration Principle" and the Strong Right to Treatment
We have shown that it is the treatment purpose of police power com-
mitments that redeems their non-punitive purpose, and is thus constitution-
ally required. We now add to the analysis the "duration principle," and
argue that the two requirements together allow states only a reasonable
period to accomplish the goals of treatment. 220 Due process commands that
the conditions and duration of confinement bear some reasonable relation
to its civil purpose-treatment-without which incapacitation serves as
mere preventive detention, "a warehousing operation for social misfits." '21
This formula requires reasonable progress toward release, which is the goal
of treatment. When it is clear that the treatment goal is hopeless, release
may be required.
This strong right to treatment is derived from the durational principle
that commitments must end when they are no longer justified, which con-
stitutes a fundamental distinction from criminal confinements, the validity
of which depends on the constitutionality of the initial judgment of convic-
218 See Robert Prentky, Rape: Behavioral Aspects, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE
1300, 1303, 1305 (Joshua Dressier ed., 2002) (surveying treatment programs and concluding that the
"jury is still out" on treatment efficacy).
219 See discussion supra note 23 and accompanying text.
220 It bears mention that the treatment-oriented claim asserted in Seling v. Young differs from the
discussion here. Young argued that the fact that he had been "held in punitive conditions for nearly ten
years ... demonstrates that the treatment goal of the statute is a sham." Brief for Respondent at 10,
Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001). Young thus mainly argued that the evidence supported "proof of
an unconstitutional purpose in passing the statute," rather than that the State had exceeded its reason-
able oPportunity to provide treatment. Id. at 24.
Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1969); see also Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d
1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that due process requires that committees be provided "a realistic
opportunity to be cured or improve the mental condition for which they were confined"); Ohlinger v.
Watson, 652 F.2d 775, 778 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Adequate and effective treatment is constitutionally re-
quired because, absent treatment, appellants could be held indefinitely as a result of their mental ill-
ness.").
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
tion. By tying the right to treatment to the durational principle, we also
provide a partial answer to the question of remedy. The clearly established
remedy for a commitment that has exceeded its constitutionally permissible
duration is release.222
Our argument proceeds in two steps. First, we trace the jurisprudential
evolution of the duration principle, briefly touched upon earlier.22 a Second,
we show that its limits apply to the right to treatment, allowing a state only
a reasonable period, for each committed individual, to accomplish its
avowed treatment purpose.
The Court first articulated the duration principle in its seminal 1972
decision of Jackson v. Indiana, providing that "[a]t the least, due process
requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable
relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed." 24 The prin-
ciple has been recited, and applied, repeatedly since then,225 and is one
characteristic of SVP laws cited to establish and sustain their legitimacy.226
The duration principle requires release when circumstances become
constitutionally inadequate to support civil commitment, and has been ap-
plied in two types of situations. First, the Court has ordered release when
the circumstances that originally justified commitment no longer obtain.
This principle was applied in Donaldson, where the Court squarely held
that commitment "could not constitutionally continue after [its justifying]
basis no longer existed., 227 The Court extended the principle to the police
power context in Jones v. United States,2 1 where the Court examined the
222 See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (stating that the states cannot continue to
hold in civil confinement a person who is no longer mentally ill); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S.
563, 580 (1975) (noting that "confinement must cease when [its] reasons no longer exist"); Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (holding that a committee "cannot be held more than the reasonable
period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain ...
capacity in the foreseeable future").
223 See supra notes 155-158 and accompanying text.
224 Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738. Even prior to Jackson, it appeared well established that civilly
committed individuals, including those held under police power commitments after a finding of not
guilty by reason of insanity, could be confined only so long as "the present status of the patient is such
that continued confinement is justifiable." Dixon v. Jacobs, 427 F.2d 589, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
225 See, e.g., Young, 531 U.S. at 265; Foucha, 504 U.S. at 79; Jones v. United States, 463 U.S.
354, 368 (1983).
226 See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 368-69 (1997) (concluding that because state
law "permitted immediate release upon a showing that the individual is no longer dangerous or men-
tally impaired, we cannot say that it acted with punitive intent"); Martin v. Reinstein, 987 P.2d 779, 786
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (stating that an SVP "must be afforded treatment and must be examined at least
annually to determine whether his mental disorder has sufficiently improved that he no longer poses a
danger to the public"); In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 997 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) (stating that "commit-
ted persons must be released as soon as they are no longer dangerous"); State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115,
127 (Wis. 1985) ("Thus, the duration of an individual's commitment is intimately linked to treatment of
his mental condition.").
227 Donaldson, 422 U.S. at 575.
228 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
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permissible duration of commitment for an insanity defense acquitee. Re-
jecting the argument that the defendant's civil commitment could extend
no longer than the maximum prescribed criminal sentence, the Court, quot-
ing Jackson, observed that "[t]he Due Process Clause 'requires that the
nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the
purpose for which the individual is committed."'229 The Court then ex-
plained that the "[tihe purpose of commitment ... is to treat the individ-
ual's mental illness and protect him and society from his potential danger-
ousness."23 ° Moreover, "the committed acquittee is entitled to release
when he has recovered his sanity or is no longer dangerous."23' Finally, in
Foucha, the Court ordered the release of an insanity acquitee who, while
apparently still "dangerous," was no longer "mentally ill. 232 "Thus," the
Court concluded, "the basis for holding Foucha in a psychiatric facility as
an insanity acquittee has disappeared, and the State is no longer entitled to
hold him on that basis. 23 3 Taken together, these cases establish that, with
the passage of time, the state's interest or purpose upon which commitment
is justified can be rendered constitutionally suspect.
The second category of duration cases involves a subtle but important
difference: Although the state's purpose for commitment remains constitu-
tionally valid, its accomplishment within a reasonable period has become
doubtful, and thus the commitment has exceeded its permissible duration.
Implicit in these cases is the constitutional expectation that states have only
a reasonable period of time to accomplish their legitimate commitment
objectives. These cases recognize that the constitutional permissibility of
confinement depends not only on the harshness of conditions, but also on
duration. Punitiveness is not only a momentary measure, but also a cumu-
lative one. Confinement that is non-punitive, in short, can become punitive
if its duration is excessive.
In Jackson, for instance, the Court invalidated Indiana's right to hold,
for an indefinite period, a criminal defendant deemed incompetent to stand
trial. 234 The State, rather, could hold Jackson only for the "'reasonable
period of time' necessary to determine whether there is a substantial
chance of his attaining the capacity to stand trial in the foreseeable fu-
ture. 2 35 And, even though the state's interest in evaluating Jackson and
rendering him competent for trial remained unabated, the Court held that
Jackson's "continued commitment must be justified by progress toward
229 Id. at 368 (quoting Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738).
230lId.
231 Id
232 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71,81 (10992).
233 Id. at 78.
234 Jackson, 406 U.S. at 733.
235 Id.
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that goal." 3 Likewise, in United States v. Salerno,37 the Court empha-
sized that the pretrial detention permitted by the federal Bail Reform Act
had "stringent time limitations." 8 The Court made explicit the connection
between duration and punishment, but "intimate[d] no view as to the point
at which detention in a particular case might become excessively pro-
longed, and therefore punitive, in relation to Congress's regulatory goal." '39
A similar view was voiced in Bell v. Wolfish,"4o another pre-trial confine-
ment case. The Court warned that any regime involving endurance of
"4genuine privations and hardship over an extended period of time might
raise serious questions under the Due Process Clause as to whether those
conditions amounted to punishment.""24
Most recently, in Zadvydas v. Davis,42 the Court examined provisions
of federal immigration law that authorized civil detention of deportees
while they awaited deportation. 3 For some deportees, deportation is de-
layed because no country can be found to accept the individual. 2" Al-
though the Court eventually determined that this policy of indefinite deten-
tion was contrary to applicable law, 45 its statutory analysis was conducted
against the backdrop of the Court's due process jurisprudence. The Zadvy-
das majority cited Jackson for the proposition that "where detention's goal
is no longer practically attainable, detention no longer 'bear[s] [a] reason-
able relation to the purpose for which the individual [was] committed." 2 46
The Court concluded that a deportee may not be held once it is determined
that there is "no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably fore-
seeable future .... And for detention to remain reasonable, as the period
of prior post-removal confinement grows, what counts as the 'reasonably
foreseeable future' conversely would have to shrink. '247
236 Id. at 738. In McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245, 249 (1972), decided the
same term as Jackson, the Court likewise deemed unconstitutional the indefinite confinement of an
individual who had been confined for purposes of "observation."
237481 U.S. 739 (1987).
238 Id. at 747.
239 Id. at 747 n.4.
240441 U.S. 520 (1979).
241 Id. at 542; see also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 269 (1984) ("There is no indication in the
statute itself that preventive detention is used or intended as a punishment. First of all, the detention is
strictli!limited in time.").
533 U.S. 678 (2001).
243 Id. at 699.
244 Id. at 711.
245 Id. at 699.
246 Id. at 690 (quoting Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715,738 (1972)) (alteration in Zadvydas).
247 Id. at 701. Zadvydas confirms the view of numerous district court and appellate holdings
finding serious constitutional problems with indefinite detention by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service ("INS"). See, e.g., Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 821-22 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the INS
may not indefinitely hold alien where no reasonable likelihood existed for removal); Koita v. Reno, 113
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These cases teach that punishment comprises not only unduly harsh
conditions, but also confinement that is durationally out of proportion to
the state's non-punitive purpose. Whether confinement is punitive thus
turns on proportionality-which, in turn, can depend on duration. Al-
though the state's "interest" remains constant (assuming that the need for
treatment, evaluation, restoration, deportation, or protection remain un-
changed), at some point the cumulative imposition on the individual's lib-
erty outweighs the government's interest, requiring an end to the confine-
ment. In the terminology of Mendoza-Martinez, the confinement has be-
come "excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned." '48
In the same way, confinement can become excessive in relation to
treatment, the "alternative purpose" that ensures the non-punitiveness of
police power commitments. States are entitled to a reasonable opportu-
nity to achieve a reduction of risk via treatment. Confinement becomes
excessive when there is no "reasonable progress" toward that end, and
when there is "no significant likelihood of ... [risk reduction] in the rea-
sonably foreseeable future."25 Like the alternative purposes in the dura-
tion cases, treatment no longer outweighs the cumulative imposition on the
individual's freedom.2
Critics might raise two objections to the foregoing analysis. First, they
might observe that police power commitments serve dual purposes-
incapacitation and treatment. Even if treatment no longer justifies con-
finement, the danger remains and continues to support the state's
incapacitation purpose. But, as the cases plainly demonstrate,
incapacitation alone supports, at most, confinement that is strictly time
limited. That is the lesson of Salerno and Foucha. In Zadvydas, as well,
the Court stated that dangerousness did not provide a justification for
indefinite "preventive detention" of deportees.252
Second, critics might argue that civil commitments are sui generis.
F. Supp. 2d. 737, 741 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (stating that mandatory detention requirement of INS may
violate substantive due process rights); Kay v. Reno, 94 F. Supp. 2d 546, 552 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (holding
that the NS's mandatory detention requirement violated the alien's substantive due process rights);
Duong v. INS, 118 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1067 (S.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that indefinite incarceration of
alien violated his substantive due process right); Nguyen v. Fasano, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1110-11 (S.D.
Cal. 2000) (holding that, when removal of deportable alien is not foreseeable, detention by the INS
becomes punitive after a certain amount of time).
248 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169 (1963).
249 See, e.g., Thielman v. Leean, 140 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1000 (W.D. Wis. 2001) (noting that "be-
cause one of the purposes for which sexually violent persons are committed ... is to receive treatment,
the conditions and duration of plaintiff's confinement must be reasonably related to that purpose").250 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
251 Note, as well, that the constitutional analysis at work is individual (or, in the parlance of
Young, "as applied"). So it was in Jackson and Zadvydas that the Court focused its inquiry on whether
competency or deportation can be achieved for the individual; group-based efficacy is irrelevant.
252 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 691.
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
Such an inference might be drawn from additional language in Zadvydas to
the effect that "[i]n cases in which preventive detention is of potentially
indefinite duration, we have also demanded that the dangerousness ration-
ale be accompanied by some other special circumstance, such as mental
illness, that helps to create the danger."'253 The unarticulated premise is
that, somehow, mental illness changes the constitutional calculus, exempt-
ing the liberty-deprivation of civil commitment from the due process limits
of durational proportionality. This would explain the Court's dicta dis-
cussed above suggesting that it is permissible to detain dangerous mentally
disordered persons for whom no treatment is available.254
Such an argument, while benefiting from an alluring definitiveness,
suffers from a fatal failure to distinguish among forms of civil commit-
ment. Mental infirmity indeed can, in limited circumstances, change the
constitutional calculus, but the variety of mental disorder in SVP cases falls
outside of this narrow band, for several reasons.
First, in parens patriae cases, mental illness manifests as incompe-
tence-the inability to care for oneself-and can justify the state's inter-
vention in service of the individual's "best interests." As a result, in rare
instances, if necessitated by severe, untreatable illness, even unlimited
state-intervention is not punishment, so long as it serves the individual's
interests (e.g., the facts in Youngberg).2" However, it has never been ar-
gued that modem SVP laws are characterized in any manner by benign
parens patriae considerations, and therefore this limited justification for
custodial confinement has no applicability.
Second, a finding of criminal insanity might justify indefinite com-
mitment of the mentally disordered-such as the Court approved in Jones
v. United States2Sn-even of persons with untreatable impairments. If this
were not so a gap would exist in the system of social control: States would
lack any means of confining dangerous persons exempt from both the
criminal and civil commitment systems.257 This gap intensifies the state's
interest in crossing over to the civil system, which serves as the only avail-
able form of social control.258 In short, for such insanity acquitees, lack of
253 Id.
254 See supra notes 183-184 and accompanying text.
255 See supra notes 161-162 and accompanying text.
256 463 U.S. 354, 370 (1983) (recognizing "the widely and reasonably held view that insanity ac-
quitees constitute a special class that should be treated differently from other candidates for commit-
ment").
257 Foucha confirms this very point: The insanity acquitee, having recovered his sanity (albeit
still "dangerous"), is then subject to the "normal" means of social control-the criminal justice sys-
tem-in the event further criminal activity occurs. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 82-85
(19921 8 See Eric S. Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence: Setting Principled Constitutional Boundaries
on Sex Offender Commitments, 72 IND. L.J. 157, 213 (1996) (discussing the use of civil institutionaliza-
tion as a tool to prevent sexual violence).
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available effective treatment should not disable society's ability to defend
itself against violence by means of confinement. Most SVP committees,
however, are fully responsible for their prior crimes," 9 and courts have
uniformly eschewed the notion that SVP commitments are constitutional
only for persons who lack criminal responsibility." ° In other words, in the
SVP context, the etiological connection between risk and mental disorder
contributes nothing to the state's interest in confinement. If shortcomings
in treatment render civil commitment unavailable, states can rely on the
"normal means of dealing with persistent criminal conduct"-the criminal
justice system. 61
Finally, if mentally infirm persons were deemed to have a "diminished
civic personhood" that reduced their interest in liberty, 6 ' perhaps their
"excessive" confinement would be accounted for differently in the consti-
tutional calculus. Such a characterization of the mentally ill would explain
why they, but not ordinary criminals, could be civilly committed for life
without effective treatment. But, at least in modem times, no court has
tried to justify indefinite commitment on the grounds that the liberty of the
"mentally disordered" matters less than the liberty enjoyed by the non-
impaired.
In short, there is some validity in the assertion that the duration limita-
tion principle of Jackson and its progeny do not apply where the "danger"
is tied to mental impairment. However, such a view is tenable only if the
juridicial requirement of impairment is narrowed considerably. The type
of impairment characteristic of SVP committees neither enhances the
state's interest nor diminishes the individual's. Thus, in the SVP context, it
is not mental impairment that justifies the use of civil confinement; rather,
it is treatment.263 Treatment is tied to duration, and there is no logic that
suggests that the "reasonable progress" rule of Jackson (and Zadvydas)
does not also apply to treatment.
259 Eric S. Janus & Nancy Walbek, Sex Offender Commitments in Minnesota: A Descriptive
Study of Second Generation Commitments, 18 BEHAV. SCi. & L. 343, 359 (2000) (noting that almost all
SVP committees in Minnesota have been held criminally responsible for the sexual violence that is the
predicate for their commitments).
260 See, e.g., State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 287 N.W. 297, 300-01 (Minn. 1939), affd,
309 U.S. 270 (1940).
261 Foucha, 504 U.S. at 82.
262 CLIVE UNSWORTH, THE POLITICS OF MENTAL HEALTH LEGISLATION 36, 41 (1987) (arguing
that mentally disordered persons were excluded from full participation in the benefits of a legal person-
ality, characterized by "freedom, autonomy and responsibility").
263 As the D.C. Circuit put it some fifty years ago: "[W]e are here considering an indefinite com-
mitment, justifiable only upon a theory of therapeutic treatment." Miller v. Overholser, 206 F.2d 415,
419 (D.C. Cir. 1953). See also Clatterbuck v. Harris, 295 F. Supp. 84, 86 (D.D.C. 1968) (quoting
Millard v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 468, 472-73 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (stating that commitment "is justifiable
only upon a therapeutic treatment .... Lack of treatment destroys any otherwise valid reason for dif-
ferential treatment of the sexual psychopath.").
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In other words, the Jackson line of cases suggests a strong right to
treatment, one in which effective treatment facilitates real progress toward
community re-entry. The violation of the right, in turn, is remedied by
release. If otherwise, the state would have no actual purpose beyond inca-
pacitation-which in itself, as discussed, fails to qualify as a long-term,
non-punitive purpose sufficient to satisfy due process.2"
To sum up, we have identified three distinct formulations of the right
to treatment in police power civil commitments. In its weakest form, the
right is derived directly from the no-punishment principle, with treatment
signifying that the intentions of the state are non-punitive. This is the
weakest formulation because it does not necessarily entail any requirement
of treatment efficacy, and it can tolerate substantial deviation in application
over time. If the evidentiary role of treatment is to instantiate non-punitive
intent, then such factors as the level of the state's effort, and the difficulty
and novelty of the task, are relevant. However, the Court has clearly stated
that a non-punitive purpose is a constitutional predicate for a civil com-
mitment scheme. Thus, if a state's treatment conduct falls below this
weakest threshold-i.e., if it is insufficient to negate the punitive intent-it
should be expected that the commitment scheme would be found
unconstitutional, and its committees rightfully released. In Young, even
Justice Scalia appeared to assume that release from commitment would be
appropriate if the state's treatment purpose were negated by appropriate
evidence.265
Youngberg embodies the second formulation of the police power right
to treatment. This right manifests the state's obligation to respect, and en-
hance, the residual liberties of civil committees. Arguably, this right is
triggered by commitment and its post-commitment violation does not im-
plicate the constitutionality of the initial commitment itself. 6 Thus, one
would expect this right to be enforced through injunction and damages
rather than release. 67
264 See Ohlinger v. Watson, 652 F.2d 775, 778 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that "[adequate and effec-
tive treatment is constitutionally required because, absent treatment, appellants could be held indefi-
nitely as a result of their mental illness").
265 See Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 269-70 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[l]f those proceedings
fail, and the state courts authoritatively interpret the state statute as permitting impositions that are
indeed punitive, then and only then can federal courts pronounce a statute that on its face is civil to be
criminal.").
266 See, e.g., In re Turay, 986 P.2d 790, 803 (Wash. 1999) ("[A] person committed under [the
Washington State SVP law] may not challenge the actual conditions of their confinement, or the quality
of the treatment at the ... facility until they have been found to be an SVP and committed under the
provisions of [the law].").
267 See, e.g., Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1169 (9th Cir. 2000) (requiring the State of Wash-
ington "to take all reasonable steps to bring a constitutionally adequate program into reality rather than
merely describing it on paper").
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Finally, we have shown that a strong right to treatment can be derived
from the Jackson principle that the duration of confinement must be rea-
sonably related to the purposes of confinement. Confinement that is non-
punitive, because it is undertaken with the proper intent, can become puni-
tive if it is excessive in duration, as compared to its purpose. States have
only a reasonable period to accomplish their treatment objective, which is
the reduction in risk sufficient to allow release. This is an individualized
right that is predicated on efficacy. Further, because it implicates the dura-
tion of confinement, it is clearly enforceable by release.
V. ENFORCING THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT IN POLICE POWER
COMMITMENTS
Having identified several different rights to treatment, and their limits,
we now focus on enforcement, with particular regard to the strong right to
treatment explored in the previous section. As will be discussed, this
strong right compels a strong remedy for its violation-release. However,
courts in recent times have been reluctant to order release in treatment and
conditions cases. 68 What accounts for this reluctance?
We conclude that it stems from both the varied forms of the right to
treatment (some of which are enforceable by remedies short of release),2 69
and the reluctance of courts, and federal courts in particular, to interfere
with the operation of state institutions.270  We argue, however, that such
deference should not be infinite,271 and that it is limited by a heightened
scrutiny, triggered when the Court patrols the shadowy boundary between
the civil and criminal systems of social control. A rule of reason and pro-
portion does and should inhere in the Court's substantive due process ju-
risprudence. We argue that this expectation affords the state a reasonable
period of time to accomplish the ostensible treatment purposes of civil
commitment, and that reasonableness is proportionate to the danger in-
volved and the strength of the state's interest in using civil commitment to
268 See cases cited infra notes 377-404 and accompanying text.
269 See infra notes 394-401 and accompanying text.
270 See, e.g., Sharp, 233 F.3d at 1171 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)) (noting
that "[i]n order to minimize the interference by the federal judiciary with the internal operations of state
institutions, courts should show deference to the judgment exercised by a qualified professional").
271 See, e.g., id. ("Although the state enjoys wide latitude in developing treatment regimens, the
courts may take action when there is a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment or
when there has been no exercise of professional judgment at all."); Thomas S. v. Flaherty, 902 F.2d
250, 252 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that under Youngberg, decisions of professionals are presumptively
valid but not conclusive, because the court has the authority to determine if there has been a substantial
deviation from accepted standards).
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address the danger. Beyond that period, release is constitutionally com-
pelled.272
In sum, the right to treatment advanced here accommodates both mean-
ingful judicial oversight of, and ample deference to, state implementation
of SVP regimes. In this section, we show that the Court's substantive due
process jurisprudence supports this dynamic and nuanced approach to judi-
cial scrutiny of state deprivations of liberty that straddle the border of civil
and criminal methods of social control.
A. Fundamental Rights and Level of Scrutiny
In the Supreme Court's due process jurisprudence, a key first step in
the analysis is to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied
in assessing a law that infringes liberty. The Court has invoked a variety of
levels, ranging from highly deferential "rational basis" review, to interme-
diate "reasonableness" review, to its most exacting standard, "strict scru-
tiny." The level of scrutiny, as the Court's decisions have amply borne out,
often determines the outcome of a given constitutional challenge.273
Before a level of scrutiny can be identified, however, a reviewing court
must first be clear on what constitutional liberty is threatened by the gov-
ernmental action. The Court itself has quite correctly recognized that in-
voluntary civil commitment involves a "massive curtailment of liberty,
274
with uniquely stigmatizing consequences.275 As such, it would stand to
reason that the Court would unhesitatingly apply its most exacting stan-
dard-strict scrutiny-requiring that the state action serve a compelling
governmental interest and employ narrowly tailored, least restrictive means
272 See, e.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (quoting Watson v. City of
Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 533 (1963)) (alteration in Rouse) ("We also recognize that [deficiencies in
treatment] cannot be remedied immediately. But indefinite delay cannot be approved. 'The rights here
asserted are ... present rights ... and, unless there is an overwhelmingly compelling reason, they are to
be promptly fulfilled.').
273 See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1454-65 (2d ed. 1988)
(surveying decisions supporting this view); Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-
Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protec-
tion, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972) (referring to strict scrutiny as "fatal in fact").
274 Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972); see also Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493
(1980) (stating that involuntary civil commitment infringes on a defendant's liberty).
75 See Vitek, 445 U.S. at 492 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1979)) (ob-
serving that "[tlhe loss of liberty produced by an involuntary commitment is more than a loss of free-
dom from confinement. It is indisputable that commitment to a mental hospital 'can engender adverse
social consequences to the individual ....'). Insofar as those targeted by SVP laws are designated
"sex predators"--an especially opprobrious label today-such stigma is decidedly exacerbated. See
Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 377 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the "impact of an
adverse judgment against an individual deemed to be a 'sexually dangerous person' is at least as serious
as a guilty verdict in a typical criminal trial").
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available to achieve that end.276 However, while there is no question that
the liberty infringement entailed in civil commitment triggers heightened
due process scrutiny,277 the Court has noticeably failed to articulate where
on the continuum of scrutiny the various claims that have come before it
lie.
A central reason for this uncertainty is the persistent failure to accu-
rately define the nature of the right under analysis. Much as due process
doctrine in general has been justifiably condemned for its uncertainty,2 78
the Court's civil commitment jurisprudence, in particular, can be criticized
for its failure to identify with any degree of precision just what liberty in-
terest is at stake. In general, civil commitment has been said to jeopardize
the very broad "freedom from bodily restraint. ' 279  However, as Justice
Thomas has pointed out, this formulation proves too much. It would, for
example, conceivably subject the entire criminal justice system to strict
scrutiny.28° Yet, at the same time, the formulation in a sense proves too
little. Given that the protection of the public from violent offenders consti-
tutes a compelling state interest, commitment laws aimed at all dangerous
persons, whether or not mentally disordered, would seem to be sufficiently
narrowly tailored. This latter formulation, however, demonstrably fails to
take account of the Court's continued assertion that due process requires a
mental disorder predicate-not dangerousness alone-for civil commit-
ment to be justified.28'
The solution lies in a reformulation of the right involved:212 A formula-
tion that more accurately reflects the interest at stake, which is the right not
276 See TRIBE, supra note 273, at 1454 (discussing the application of the strict scrutiny analysis
for inequalities bearing on fundamental rights).
277 See, e.g., Addington, 441 U.S. at 425 (stating that "commitment for any purpose constitutes a
significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection").
278 See. e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and
Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 309, 309 (1993) (noting that "[d]ue process doctrine
subsists in confusion"); id. at 314 (noting that "[s]ubstantive due process is widely viewed as the most
problematic category in constitutional law").
279 Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992).
280 See id. at 118 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting same and dismissing "the existence of a sweep-
ing, general fundamental right to 'freedom from bodily restraint' applicable to all persons in all con-
texts"). For an extended rebuttal of this view, and an argument that strict scrutiny should apply to
claims brought by those incarcerated for victimless crimes such as marijuana use and consensual sod-
omy, see Sherry F. Colb, Freedom from Incarceration: Why Is This Right Different From All Other
Rights, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 781 (1994).
281 See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 82; see also Janus, supra note 258, at 174 (stating that courts have
held that "civil commitment may not be based on dangerousness alone").
282 See Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57
U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1106 (1990) (noting that "[a] too-abstract right will be recognizable as such
whenever its enunciation requires us to virtually ignore the rationales of the cases which allegedly
established it").
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to be confined without a criminal charge and conviction-the sine qua non
of the criminal system.1 3 The question thus becomes not (as under the
broader formulation) when can the State deprive a person of liberty, but
rather when can the State deprive a person of liberty outside the rubric of
the criminal justice system?
This more specific formulation is evidenced in the Court's most sig-
nificant due process decisions. Foremost among these is Foucha v. Louisi-
ana,284 where the Court struck down a Louisiana law that allowed danger-
ous insanity acquitees to remain under civil commitment even after they
had regained their sanity.285 Justice White's majority opinion began with
the tenet that "[f]reedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core
of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, 28 6 and emphasized the
imperative that courts not "'minimize the importance and fundamental
nature"' of this right. 87 Having noted the significance of the constitutional
terrain, Justice White proceeded to express the Court's special concern for
the need to police the boundary between criminal and civil species of lib-
erty deprivation. Because Foucha was institutionalized as a result of hav-
ing been adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity, the Court character-
ized his commitment as civil. 288 At the same time, however, a diagnostic
finding by civil authorities of dangerousness, standing alone, was "not
enough to defeat Foucha's liberty interest under the Constitution in being
freed from indefinite confinement in a mental facility." 289 The State de-
monstrably had an interest in protecting its citizens from dangerous persons
such as Foucha. The question, however, was whether its means of serving
this interest--outside of the "ordinary" rubric of the criminal justice sys-
tem-satisfied substantive due process:
[T]he State does not explain why its interest would not be
vindicated by the ordinary criminal processes involving
charge and conviction, the use of enhanced sentences for re-
cidivists, and other permissible ways of dealing with patterns
283 See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80 (acknowledging that "[a] State, pursuant to its police power, may
of course imprison convicted criminals for the purposes of deterrence and retribution"); Vitek v. Jones,
445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980) (stating that "[u]ndoubtedly, a valid criminal conviction and prison sentence
extinguish a defendant's right to freedom from confinement"); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224
(1976) (noting that "given a valid conviction, the criminal defendant has been constitutionally deprived
of his liberty," and that henceforth "the State may confine him and subject him to the rules of its prison
system so long as the conditions of confinement do not otherwise violate the Constitution").
284 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
285Id. at 71.
286 Id. at 80.
287 Id. (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987)).
288 See id. ("As Foucha was not convicted, he may not be punished .... Here, Louisiana has by
reason of his acquittal exempted Foucha from criminal responsibility .....
289 Id. at 82.
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of criminal conduct. These are the normal means of dealing
with persistent criminal conduct. Had they been employed
against Foucha when he assaulted other inmates, there is little
doubt that if then sane he could have been convicted and in-
carcerated in the usual way.2
In other words, the constitutional proof required from the State con-
cerned not solely that proof necessary to justify a deprivation of liberty, but
much more specifically, to justify the crossing by the State from the "ordi-
nary" and "normal" means of dealing with antisocial behavior (i.e., the
criminal law) to civil commitment.29" ' The constitutional task, the Foucha
Court made clear, is to guard against "substituting confinements for dan-
gerousness for our present system which, with only narrow exceptions and
aside from permissible confinements for mental illness, incarcerates only
those who are proved beyond reasonable doubt to have violated a criminal
law.9292
Justice Kennedy dissented in Foucha, but the gravamen of his dis-
agreement centered on the location of the border between criminal and
civil, and not on the need for augmented policing to protect against its
breach.2 93 He apparently agreed with the core nature of the liberty interest
involved, 294 but would hold that Foucha's confinement, resulting from a
290 Id.
291 As Professor Donald Dripps has written:
[T]he special due process doctrines of the criminal law presuppose the exclusivity of
the criminal sanction. The criminal defendant who wins acquittal at a trial cannot be
seized on the courthouse steps and chucked into a "detention facility for dangerous
persons." Certain things can be done to individuals through the criminal process or
not at all.
Donald Dripps, The Exclusivity Of The Criminal Law: Toward A "Regulatory Model" OfS or "Patho-
logical Perspective " On, the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 199, 202 (1996).
292 Foucha. 504 U.S. at 83. See also Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 380 (1986) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting), where the Court noted that:
[N]othing would prevent a State from creating an entire corpus of "dangerous per-
son" statutes to shadow its criminal code. Indeterminate commitment would derive
from proven violations of criminal statutes, combined with findings of mental disor-
ders and "criminal propensities," and constitutional protections for criminal defen-
dants would be simply inapplicable. The goal would be "treatment"; the result
would be evisceration of criminal law and its accompanying protections.
Id.
293 Foucha, 504 U.S. at 102 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas also dissented. Id. at 103-
05 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Although vigorously disagreeing with the view that Louisiana's scheme
was invalid, Justice Thomas rightly pointed out that the majority's decision could not have been
reached without application of a heightened form of constitutional scrutiny, with which he would also
disagree. Justice Thomas' dissent focused on the definition of the right involved, positing and critiqu-
ing two formulations. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). In our judgment, the formulations are straw per-
sons, one being too broad (physical liberty simpliciter) and the other too narrow (freedom from con-
finement in a "mental hospital"). Our formulation situates itself between the two.
294 Id. at 90 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("(F]reedom from this restraint is essential to the basic
definition of liberty in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. I agree with the
Court's reaffirmation of this first premise.").
finding of not guilty by reason of insanity, was a "criminal case." '295 To
Kennedy, the fact that Foucha was found, beyond a reasonable doubt, to
have committed a criminal act, relegated his case to the criminal side of the
ledger, where states "may incarcerate on any reasonable basis. '296 Accord-
ingly, Justice Kennedy stated that the Court erred in placing "primary reli-
ance on cases ... which define the due process limits for involuntary civil
commitment.', 297 Justice Kennedy emphasized, however, the constitutional
importance of preserving the boundary between the criminal and civil sys-
tems. Where this boundary has been crossed, "[w]e have often subjected to
heightened due process scrutiny, with regard to both purpose and duration,
deprivations of physical liberty.,
298
Kansas v. Hendricks2 99 and Kansas v. Crane3" also evidenced use of a
heightened concern, triggered by the government's use of its police power
to civilly commit. Although Hendricks upheld Kansas's SVP law,3"' the
decision highlighted the Court's continued concern over maintaining ap-
propriate boundaries of civil commitment. The Court framed the constitu-
tional challenge as identifying the circumstances in which the "forcible
civil detainment of people" is permissible, 0 2 noting that this is so only un-
der "certain narrow circumstances.""3 ' The requirement that a committee
have a mental impairment served to "adequately distinguish[] Hendricks
from other dangerous persons who are perhaps more properly dealt with
exclusively through criminal proceedings." 3o4 Justice Kennedy's concur-
rence likewise focused on the proper roles for criminal and civil confine-
ment, and the location of the boundary between them.0 5
In Crane, the Court again addressed the constitutionality of Kansas's
295 Id. at 94 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
296 Id. at 93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
297 Id. at 90 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
298 Id. at 93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
299 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
300534 U.S. 407 (2002).
301 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 350.
302 Id. at 357.
303 Id.
304 ld. at 360.
305 In particular, Justice Kennedy stated:
The concern ... is whether it is the criminal system or the civil system which should
make the decision in the first place. If the civil system is used simply to impose pun-
ishment after the State makes an improvident plea bargain on the criminal side, then
it is not performing its proper function. These concerns persist whether the civil
confinement statute is put on the books before or after the offense. We should bear
in mind that while incapacitation is a goal common to both the criminal and civil
systems of confinement, retribution and general deterrence are reserved for the
criminal system alone.
Id. at 373 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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SVP law-and again upheld it, concluding that substantive due process did
not require that a committee have a "total" inability to refrain from sexual
misconduct. °" In so holding, the seven-member majority was even more
explicit in situating the criminal/civil boundary at the center of constitu-
tional analysis, asserting that states must "distinguish the dangerous sexual
offender whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects
him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist con-
victed in an ordinary criminal case."30 7 Such a distinction "is necessary lest
'civil commitment' become a 'mechanism for retribution or general deter-
rence'-functions properly those of criminal law, not civil commitment.""3
Viewed as such, the right warrants a heightened level of constitutional
scrutiny, not simply because of the undisputed core importance of liberty,
but also because of the need to guard against the understandable desire of
government to maintain a system of incapacitation that parallels the crimi-
nal system. Such an alternate system has great appeal to the government
insofar as it is not obliged to observe constitutional constraints applicable
in the criminal system. Although many state commitment regimes now
entail criminal-style protections, they are not required to afford such pro-
tections because the laws are deemed civil.3" They thus also avoid a basic
constraint fundamental to the operation of the criminal system-proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt of a legislatively specified criminal act.3 0 In
306 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 411 (2002).
307 Id. at 410, 413 (stating that the distinction is necessary to ensure that the civil system distin-
guishes SVPs "from other dangerous persons who are perhaps more properly dealt with exclusively
throuh criminal proceedings") (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357-58, 360).
3o Id. at 412 (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 372-73 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
309 See, e.g., Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 367 (1986) (the right against self-incrimination does
not apply in sex offender commitments).
Indeed, SVP states already show considerable variability in the degree of protections and rights
afforded. See, e.g., State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 287 N.W. 297, 299 (Minn. 1939) (holding
that a jury trial is not mandated for sex offender commitments), afftd, 309 U.S. 270 (1940)); see also
People v. Kibel, 701 P.2d 37, 37 (Colo. 1985) (holding that the state may provide committed sex of-
fenders fewer procedural protections than either civil committees or mentally ill prisoners). But see
Stachulak v. Coughlin, 520 F.2d 931, 931 (7th Cir. 1975) (interpreting Illinois law) (requiring proof
beyond a reasonable doubt in first-generation SVP proceeding); People v. Bumick, 535 P.2d 352, 353
(Cal. 1975) (same).
310 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 3.2, at 195 (2d ed. 1986)
("Bad thoughts alone cannot constitute a crime; there must be an act .... "); see also State v. Brewer,
767 So. 2d 1249, 1250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (observing that the Constitution guarantees the "right
not to be convicted of or punished for a crime which has not occurred"). SVP laws, on the other hand,
seek to enable the states to commit individuals before they commit "horrifying crimes." Sarah H.
Francis, Note, Sexually Dangerous Person Statutes: Constitutional Protections of Society and the
Mentally Ill or Emotionally-Driven Punishment?, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 125, 145 (1995). Thus,
while In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970), requires states "to prove every element of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt," SVP laws guarantee at most proof of a current diagnosis and a predicted
future crime, a far less exacting determination.
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short, unlike the criminal law,3t' SVP laws effectively allow confinement
based on the "status" of being a dangerous person.312
Moreover, even if such protections are extended, they cannot substitute
for the substantive right of citizens to demand that government satisfy the
expectations of its putative civil confinement. Even the most demanding
procedural regime-which, at best, fairly and accurately delimits persons
warranting commitment as an initial matter---can fail to afford substantive
protection to those kept after the government's civil purpose evaporates.
Heightened scrutiny thus helps ensure that the government will be held to
its constitutional bargain and the largesse afforded states in administering
their civil commitment regimes; it ensures that states will not "cut cor-
ners."'a As noted by one court some forty years ago:
The creation of a non-medically determinable category of
persons who may be confined for indeterminate periods by a
civil proceeding is so serious a departure from traditional
concepts of justice that it deserves a critical analysis on the
broadest of terms after a careful factual development of its
present operation.3"4
Having established that heightened scrutiny is required, the challenge
remains of determining what level of scrutiny, beyond rational basis re-
view, applies. As other commentators 315 and Justice Thomas316 have noted,
the Court's civil confinement rhetoric has invoked a range of standards
without actually naming them. Professor Cornwell in particular has argued
that the Court uses a "more rigorous form of heightened scrutiny," albeit
not "strict scrutiny. ' '3 7 As a result, states must have an "exceedingly per-
suasive justification" for their legislative purpose, and a "demonstrated and
significant linkage" between the classification and the purpose of the legis-
lation. 18
311 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 660 (1962) (holding that a criminal conviction can-
not rest on "status," but rather only a criminal act).312 See, e.g., People v. Kibel, 701 P.2d 37, 44 (Colo. 1985) (noting the argument that sex offend-
ers are held based on their status-"their dangerous character"-rather than an act).
313 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 396 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also St. Regis Pa-
per Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208, 229 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (urging that "the Government
should turn square corners in dealing with the people").
314 Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506, 517 (4th Cir. 1964).
315 See John Kip Comwell, Confining Mentally Disordered "Super Criminals ": A Realignment of
Rights in the Nineties, 33 Hous. L. REv. 651, 679-81 (1996) (noting uncertainty in applicable scrutiny
for classifications affecting involuntary commitments); Stephen R. McAllister, Sex Offenders and
Mental Illness: A Lesson in Federalism and the Separation of Powers, 4 PSYCH., PUB. POL'Y, & L.
268, 274-78 (1998) (same).
316 See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 116-17 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
317 Cornwell, supra note 315, at 68 1.
318 Id.
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A review of the Court's recent jurisprudence supports this contention.
In United States v. Salerno,"9 the Court employed heightened scrutiny lan-
guage as it emphasized that the government's circumscribed use of pretrial
detention under the Bail Reform Act of 1984 "narrowly focuses on a par-
ticularly acute problem in which the Government interests are overwhelm-
ing.'' 2  In Foucha, the Court invalidated a Louisiana law that allowed civil
confinement of insanity acquitees who, although still dangerous, were no
longer mentally ill.32 As noted by Justice Thomas in dissent, if the Court
were in actuality subjecting the Louisiana law to mere "reasonable" basis
scrutiny, it would have withstood the due process challenge.322
The Court's most recent decision on SVP laws, Kansas v. Crane,.3
evinces a similar heightened scrutiny. In its Crane briefs, Kansas argued
that the Court should subject the commitment criteria contained in Kansas
law to "reasonableness" review, allowing states wide latitude in accommo-
dating the fit between the operative classification ("mentally disordered")
and the goals of the legislation.3 24 A seven-member majority of the Court,
however, felt otherwise, holding that mental disorders must satisfy a con-
stitutionally set threshold ("serious difficulty in controlling behavior"), tied
specifically to the state's interest in using civil commitment (as opposed to
the criminal law) to control antisocial behavior.325 Taking their cue from
the Supreme Court, state courts have likewise applied a more exacting
standard of review when addressing due process challenges to commit-
326ments.
319 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
320 Id. at 750; see also id. at 749 (noting that "[t]he government's interest in preventing crime by
arrestees in preventing crime by arrestees is both legitimate and compelling").
321 Foucha, 504 U.S. at 86.
322 Id. at 116-17 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
323 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
324 The State's argument rested on its interpretation of the Court's civil commitment jurispru-
dence, focusing particularly on the lack of medical or scientific consensus on issues of diagnosis, predi-
cation and treatment of sexual offending. Brief for State of Kansas at 14-15, Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S.
407 (2002) (No. 00-957) (asserting that "Hendricks confirms that substantive due process notions only
require that State legislatures choose between reasonable options supported by the legitimate judgments
of mental health professionals, especially when there may not be consensus on particular medical or
scientific questions").
325 Crane, 534 U.S. at 408, 413. Furthermore, the Court implicitly rejected the State's deferential
"medical uncertainty" argument. The Court's analytic formulation in Crane, "serious difficulty in
controlling behavior," arises from constitutional policy, not science (though, of course, its application
will require science in particular cases). Id. at 413.
6 See, e.g., Hubbart v. Superior Court, 969 P.2d 584, 593 n.20 (Cal. 1999) (stating that the court
"has traditionally subjected involuntary civil commitment statutes to the most rigorous form of consti-
tutional review"); In re Hay, 953 P.2d 666, 675 (Kan. 1998) ("There is no doubt that the civil commit-
ment of sexually violent predators involves so significant a deprivation of liberty that the protections of
due process and equal protection are involved. This clearly requires that we apply the strict scrutiny
test and the analysis it involves."); In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 914 (Minn. 1994) (noting that "the
state must show a legitimate and compelling interest to justify any deprivation of a person's physical
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The foregoing, however, fails to explain the "reasonable relation" lan-
guage reflexively used by the Court when assessing civil commitments.
For example, Jackson327 and Youngbergi 28 both speak in terms of "reason-
ableness," prompting one commentator to interpret the Court's due process
jurisprudence as entailing a deferential "reasonable basis" standard of re-
view.329 The deference stems from the understandable reluctance, deriving
from separation of powers concerns, to license onerous judicial oversight
of the complex functions of state institutions, or to dampen creative state
problem-solving in areas of uncertain science. In a corollary sense, defer-
ence serves the interest of institution building; it takes time and money to
build a professionally proper treatment program, especially in areas that are
new and developing, such as sex offender treatment. Finally, federalism
can, under certain circumstances, increase the reluctance of federal courts
to interfere in state action .330 Altogether, these considerations provide
states a strong measure of latitude.
Again, however, this deference is not without limit, as the Court itself
has suggested. For example, although the Court has said that the duration
of confinement must be reasonably related to its purpose,331 it has also said
that commitment must end when the grounds for it are no longer present.332
Furthermore, although the Court has said that "the States retain consider-
able leeway in defining the mental abnormalities and personality disorders
that make an individual eligible for commitment,, 33 it has limited the
kinds of "mental disorder" that qualify for commitment, 334 and insisted that
"dangerous" persons be freed when they no longer satisfy this require-
ment.3 5 Perhaps more to the point, while states are afforded considerable
deference in the abstract exercise of developing terminology and substan-
freedom"); In re Campbell, 986 P.2d 771, 774 (Wash. 1999) (en bane) (applying strict scrutiny to
determine whether "conditions violate the detainees' rights"); State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, 122 (Wis.
1995) (noting that "legislation that restricts a fundamental liberty requires this court to apply strict
scrutiny to its due process analysis").
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
328 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982).
329 See McAllister, supra note 315, at 282.
330As discussed above, federalism concerns loomed large in Seling v. Young, especially in Justice
Scalia's concurrence, explaining in large measure his (and the majority's) reluctance to approve a
federal role in judging the actual implementation of Washington's SVP law. Seling v. Young, 531 U.S.
250, 264-65, 269-70 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring). We argue that the concerns in Young were anoma-
lous, arising because the federal constitutional issue reached the federal courts without a thorough
hearing in the state courts. In the normal course of events, claims for release from confinement will
reach the federal courts only in postures that guarantee prior state court examination. See supra note
96.
331 Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738.
332 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574-75 (1975).
333 Kansas v. Crane, 504 U.S. 407, 413 (2002).
334 Id. at 412-13.
335 See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71,86 (1992).
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tive legal bases for commitment--especially in an area of such definitional
disagreement as mental health-less deference is deserved post-hoc when
an individual petitioner, deprived of liberty on a long-term basis, seeks
accountability from the government for its action.336 This is especially so
when courts patrol the civil-criminal boundary, assessing the very aspect of
SVP regimes that mark them as civil (and hence constitutional).
The Court has exhibited a similar capacity to accommodate both defer-
ence and scrutiny in its substantive due process jurisprudence more gener-
ally. For example, in Zablocki v. Redhail,aa7 the Court identified the right
to marry as being of "fundamental importance, 338 and thus required means
"closely tailored" to "sufficiently important state interests.3 39  Nonethe-
less, the Court stated:
By reaffirming the fundamental character of the right to
marry, we do not mean to suggest that every state regulation
which relates in any way to the incidents of or prerequisites
for marriage must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny. To the
contrary, reasonable regulations that do not significantly in-
terfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship
may legitimately be imposed.3 °
Similarly, in Troxel v. Granville34 a majority of the Court deemed fun-
damental the right of parents to raise their children, and thus invalidated a
state law authorizing wide grounds for any person to seek visitation.342
Troxel thus intimated permissible outer bounds for state intrusions on the
parental right. But clearly, within those outer boundaries, states retain sub-
stantial discretion in articulating standards for, and adjudging individual
cases of, child custody and visitation.343
Thus, we propose that the outer boundaries of involuntary civil com-
mitment-in particular, its boundary with the criminal law-should be
336 See id. at 80 (recognizing "a [due process] component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful
government actions").
337 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
338 Id. at 383.
339 Id. at 388.
340 Id. at 386.
341 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
342 Id. at 65-67, 75. While the Court itself did not specify a level of scrutiny, Justice Thomas, in
his concurrence, stated: "I would apply strict scrutiny to infringements of fundamental rights." Id. at 80
(Thomas, J., concurring).
343 For example, Justice Kennedy's dissent suggests that a "best interests" standard might be ap-
propriate in certain circumstances. See id. at 98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that the "best inter-
ests standard [is] sufficient in [an] adoption proceeding to protect [the] interests of [a] natural father
who [has] not legitimated the child"). Clearly, such a standard would allow state courts great discretion
in adjudicating individual claims.
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carefully policed by the courts. Within those bounds, states have consider-
able discretion; but even then, their actions must have a reasonable relation
to the constitutionally mandated standards constraining civil commit-
ment. ' " In their patrol of the boundary, courts must be mindful that treat-
ment serves as the sole consideration that inoculates long-term, secure con-
finement against the "punishment" label. 45 Without careful judicial scru-
tiny to root out ineffective treatment programs, SVP commitment becomes
indistinguishable from lifetime imprisonment.
B. Enforcement of the Right to Treatment
Having delineated the basic contours of due process in police power
commitments and the related role of treatment, it remains to be addressed
how heightened scrutiny influences analysis.3 46  To be sure, the govern-
mental interest in protecting the public from SVPs is powerful, and the
deference robust-affording states ample leeway in administering their
regimes. In this sense, the reasonable-duration formulation of the right to
treatment advanced here incorporates those principles.
In a series of decisions over the years, lower courts have adopted legal
theories consistent with this analysis, indicating that serious violations of
the right to treatment should result in release. In these cases, the courts
engaged in as applied analysis to examine whether the actual implementa-
tion of the treatment objective was sufficient to support continued civil
confinement. However, more recent decisions, addressing the modem
wave of SVP laws, evince a markedly more hostile position toward en-
forcement of the right. In this section, we first discuss this older generation
of cases, and then turn to newer cases-arguing that, despite the apparent
hostility of the newer cases, their jurisprudence is not inconsistent with the
view advanced here.
344 Our formulation helps explain why a number of decisions have applied a lower level of scru-
tiny to equal protection claims attacking procedural differences within civil commitment regimes. See,
e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321-28 (1993) (applying rational basis standard to review the differ-
ence in procedures used to commit those who are mentally ill and those who are mentally retarded);
People v. Pembrock, 342 N.E.2d 28, 30 (111. 1976) (applying the rational basis test to different com-
mitment procedures for sexually violent predators and the mentally ill). Further, mental illness is not a
suspect classification, which also explains why courts have been disinclined to apply strict scrutiny in
the context of equal protection claims. See, e.g., In re Bailey, 740 N.E.2d 1146, 1151 (I1l. Ct. App.
2000) (the rational basis test, as opposed to strict scrutiny, applies to equal protection challenges in-
volving involuntary commitment classifications); In re Turay, 986 P.2d 790, 806 (Wash. 1999) (en
banc) (applying the rational basis test to an equal protection challenge). But see In re Williams, 628
N.W.2d 447, 451, 453 (Iowa 2001) (applying the rational basis test to a substantive due process claim
assertin$ that a SVP committee was entitled to the "least restrictive alternative").
See supra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
346 As discussed in Part V, heightened scrutiny applies in the due process analysis of police
power commitments and accompanying treatment. See supra notes 282-326 and accompanying text.
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Rouse v. Cameron"' represents one of the first notable decisions in this
tradition of identifying a durationally related right to effective treatment.
Rouse involved an insanity acquitee who had been held under a civil com-
mitment for four years-with no end "in sight" and, allegedly, without
appropriate treatment-who sought release in a habeas proceeding. 3"' The
D.C. Circuit, Judge Bazelon writing for the court, noted that the challenge
was an "as applied" challenge to confinement under a District of Columbia
statute,349 which did not challenge the per se constitutionality of the provi-
sion.3' ° Addressing the habeas claim, Judge Bazelon allowed the state a
"reasonable opportunity to initiate treatment,""' and directed consideration
of a variety of factors, including "the length of time the patient has lacked
adequate treatment, the length of time he has been in custody, the nature of
the mental condition that caused his acquittal, and the degree of danger,
resulting from the condition, that the patient would present if released." '52
This governmental latitude, however, is not indefinite. When "the opportu-
nity for treatment has been exhausted or treatment is otherwise inappropri-
ate," Judge Bazelon concluded, "[u]nconditional or conditional release may
be in order. 35
3
At about the same time, the Fourth Circuit in Sas v. Maryland354 articu-
lated a right to treatment in a habeas challenge to Maryland's "Defective
Delinquent" confinement scheme. 3" Although the court found the scheme
constitutional on its face, it remanded for a determination of "whether the
statute is being constitutionally applied." '56 On remand, the district court
was instructed to determine "whether the proposed objectives of the Act
are sufficiently implemented in its actual administration to support its cate-
gorization as a civil procedure and justify the elimination of conventional
criminal procedural safeguards." '357 Such an "as applied" examination was
necessary, the court explained, because:
[A] statute though "fair on its face and impartial in appear-
ance" may be fraught with the possibility of abuse in that if
not administered in the spirit in which it is conceived it can
become a mere device for warehousing the obnoxious and
347 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
348 Id. at 453.
349Id. at 452.
3501d.
351 Id. at 458.
352 Id.
353 Id. at 458-59.
354 334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964).
355Id. at 509.
356 Id.
357 Id.
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antisocial elements of society.3"8 . . . Deficiencies in staff, fa-
cilities, and finances would undermine the efficacy of the In-
stitution and the justification for the law, and ultimately the
constitutionality of its application.3' 9
More recently, in People v. Feagley,360 the California Supreme Court
ordered the release of an individual committed under the State's sexually
dangerous person statute, holding that "the effect of a statutory declaration
of the right to treatment may be negated by evidence that such treatment is
not in fact provided."36' Without treatment, the court noted, "nothing re-
mains but bare incarceration 'for the protection of society." 362 The court
held that "medical treatment [is] the raison d'etre of the mentally disor-
dered sex offender law, it is its sole constitutional justification. 363 More-
over, "[a]dequate and effective treatment is constitutionally required be-
cause, absent treatment, the hospital is transformed 'into a penitentiary
where one could be held indefinitely for no convicted offense."' 3
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Page,36 the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court ordered the release of an individual committed pursuant to
the Commonwealth's Sexually Dangerous Persons Law.366 Since no treat-
ment center had been established, committees were housed in prisons with
the general prison population.367 Assuming that the statute was non-penal
in character-and thus constitutional on its face-the court nonetheless
ordered the release, holding that "it is necessary that the remedial aspect of
confinement thereunder have foundation in fact. It is not sufficient that the
Legislature announce a remedial purpose if the consequences to the indi-
vidual are penal." '368
The remedial result in these cases finds support in judicial decisions
that have mandated release to remedy the imposition of unconstitutional
conditions experienced by individuals held under various forms of civil
358 Id. at 516.
359 Id. at 516-17.
360 535 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1975).
361 Id. at 396.
362 Id.
363 Id. at 386.
364 Id. at 387 (quoting Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781,784 (M.D. Ala. 1971)).
365 159 N.E.2d 82 (Mass. 1959).
366 Id. at 85.
367 Id. at 84-85.
368 Id. at 85. Similarly, in People v. Hutchings, 347 N.Y.S.2d 268 (Sup. Ct. 1973), a New York
trial court vacated a special "one-day-to-life" sentence for a sex offender, on the ground that the treat-
ment contemplated by the sentence had not been provided. Concluding that the Department of Correc-
tions "had no intention of fulfilling its obligations" to provide treatment, the court vacated the sentence.
Id. at 270. The court indicated that Hutchings would be re-sentenced. Id.
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authority. In a typical older case, In re Maddox,369 the Michigan Supreme
Court ordered release of a habeas petitioner committed under the state's
facially constitutional sex psychopath law, but held in the state's prison.370
Admonishing that "courts have upheld the civil and noncriminal proce-
dures of the statute in direct relationship to its stated purpose and to the
treatment contemplated,"37' the court held that the conditions in the prison
were constitutionally inadequate.3 72 The court ordered the individual re-
leased if an appropriate placement was not provided within one month.373
The foregoing cases, decided in a time of heightened judicial sensitiv-
ity to institutional abuses, stand in contrast to more recent decisions. These
latter cases suggest that repair-not release-is the appropriate remedy.
Although they might not appear at first blush to do so, they in fact lend
support to our approach to the right to treatment.
To begin, several state courts have held that individuals may not raise
as applied conditions of confinement issues at the initial commitment hear-
ing. In In re McClatchey,37 4 for example, the Washington Supreme Court
specifically acknowledged that treatment and conditions of confinement
are central factors in determining the facial validity of a SVP law, and that
its cases establishing the facial validity of the statute "left the door open for
a challenge to the statute as applied to the facts in an individual case."'37'
However, for due process purposes, "unless and until [petitioner] is found
to be a sexually violent predator, and committed . . ., the constitutionality
of the statute as applied to the facts of his case cannot be determined. 3 76
This forbearance is consistent with the analytic approach advanced here,
given that the right to treatment is a condition subsequent to the commit-
ment, sensitive to the expectation that states have a reasonable period to
attempt treatment.
Other cases, however, have examined and rejected as applied claims
for release.377 The most sustained attention has come from the Washington
369 88 N.W.2d 470 (Mich. 1958).
370 Id. at 473.
371 Id. at 475.
372 Id. at 478.
Id.
374940 P.2d 646 (Wash. 1997) (en banc).
Id. at 647.
376 Id. at 647-48 (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972)).
It bears mention that one appellate court, in conjunction with an initial commitment, has ad-
dressed a treatment-based claim. See In re Commitment of K.D., 2003 WL 142477, at *1 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2003). In K.D., the court notes that commitment under the State SVP law "invokes a
correlative statutory and constitutional duty of appropriate treatment where feasible, designed to permit
ultimate release to the community." Id. at *2 (citing Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265-66 (2001);
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 365-68 (1997)). In short, "a court has the inherent power to exam-
ine the conditions of confinement, including treatment, prescribed by the SVPA." Id.
377 Although many such cases have foundered at the evidentiary stage, several courts have ac-
knowledged the constitutional inadequacy of particular conditions or treatment, and proceeded to
374 CONNECTICUTLAWREVIEW [Vol. 35:319
Supreme Court. Confronted with findings from federal37 and state379
courts suggesting that conditions and treatment in the SVP program fell
below constitutional standards, the response of Washington's highest court
has been decidedly hostile to SVP claimants. Nonetheless, as we suggest
below, that court's holdings are not inconsistent with our formulation of
the right to treatment.38
In re Young 81 provided the Washington Supreme Court with its initial
occasion to address the State SVP law. The court rejected Young's condi-
tions of confinement of claim, purely on the terms of the statute, noting
that "[t]here is no evidence in the record addressing either the actual condi-
tions of confinement, or the quality of treatment. These issues are not cur-
rently before the court.
382
In In re Turay,8 3 the petitioner was committed on a less than unani-
mous verdict.384 Two years later, however, the outcome was reversed, with
385the state supreme court holding that a unanimous verdict was necessary. 3 5
While his case was on remand, Turay successfully filed suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, challenging the conditions of his confinement on constitu-
tional grounds.38 6  The federal court reviewing the matter found that
Turay's "constitutional right to access to adequate mental health treatment"
had been violated, and it entered an injunction to remedy this violation.38 7
analyze directly the issue of remedy. See, e.g., Thielman v. Lecan, 140 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1001 (W.D.
Wis. 2001) ("Although the modest amount of time devoted to therapy raises questions about the state's
commitment to treatment of [SVP] patients, plaintiff has presented no evidence in the form of expert
testimony or otherwise from which this court could conclude that the amount of treatment plaintiff is
receiving is not related reasonably to treating him for his mental condition."); People v. Kibel, 701 P.2d
37, 44 (Colo. 1985) ("Because the record in these cases fails to show that either defendant was denied
treatment, we do not need to resolve these questions [of the right to treatment]"); In re Seibert, 582
N.W.2d 745, 749 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998) (finding that "[flirst, and most importantly, the evidence shows
that the treatment program at the center is tailored for individuals, including Seibert").
378 See, e.g., Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d,1 166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2000).
379 See, e.g., In re Turay, 986 P.2d 790, 812 (Wash. 1999); In re Campbell, 986 P.2d 771, 775
(Wash. 1999).
380 As discussed above, the Washington Supreme Court acknowledged that some conditions of
confinement can be so punitive as to invalidate commitments and require release. See discussion supra
notes 356-58 and accompanying text. In contrast, it appears well established that unconstitutionally
cruel and unusual conditions in a correctional setting do not require release. See, e.g., Gomez v. United
States, 899 F.2d 1124, 1126 (11 th Cir. 1990). These Eighth Amendment cases highlight the inherent
difference between criminal and civil confinement. While the validity of a criminal confinement is
established ab initio, a civil confinement remains valid only to the extent that its justification remains
valid at the moment of assessment.
381 857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1993).
38 2 Id. at 1005.
383 986 P.2d 790 (Wash. 1999).
384 Id. at 793.
385 ld.
386 Id. at 794.
387 Id.
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Later, when the state's commitment petition came on for re-trial, Turay
moved to dismiss the petition "because the conditions of his confinement
are punitive, not treatment oriented in nature., 38 8 The state trial court en-
tered findings that certain aspects of Turay's confinement violated his con-
stitutional rights, and it directed that the deficiencies be remedied within
thirty days.389 Subsequently, Turay filed another motion to dismiss the
commitment petition, arguing that his confinement amounted to "punish-
ment," and thus violated the double jeopardy clause.39 ° The trial court de-
nied Turay's motions to dismiss, and direct appeal was taken to the Wash-
ington Supreme Court.39'
The state supreme court characterized Turay's argument as claiming
that the punitive conditions of confinement rendered the SVP statute
"criminal" as applied to him, and that "in order to remedy this violation of
his constitutional rights, we must order his release. 392 The court rejected
Turay's argument as applying the wrong test: "We believe that Turay's 'as
applied' double jeopardy challenge . . . based upon the conditions at the
[commitment center], rather than the language of the statute, is flawed., 393
Further, the court stated that the federal court's finding of unconstitutional
conditions was "irrelevant ... because Turay's remedy for these unconsti-
tutional conditions is not a release from confinement. Turay's remedy for
unconstitutional conditions of confinement at the [commitment center] is,
therefore, an injunction action and/or an award of damages. 394
The court supported its remedial result in several ways. First, it noted
that "the federal court is maintaining a zealous watch over the conditions at
[the commitment center] to enforce the injunction that it put in place. Ac-
cordingly, Turay has an adequate remedy that will guarantee that the condi-
tions at the [center] will meet or exceed constitutional standards." '395 Be-
cause the conditions were in the process of being remedied, Turay had
failed to "prove not only that the conditions of his confinement [were] con-
stitutionally deficient in some manner, but that these deficiencies [were]
'so punitive' that they wholly render[ed] the application of [the SVP stat-
ute] criminal rather than civil." '396
Despite its apparent hostility to the right to treatment in police power
cases, the Washington Supreme Court's jurisprudence is in fact quite com-
388 Id. at 793.
3 89 Id. at 794.
390 Id.
391Id.
39 2 Id. at 809.
393 Id. at 810.
394Id. at 812.
395 Id.
396 Id.
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patible with the formulation advanced here. The court acknowledged the
existence of a constitutional right to treatment, and that the claim could be
brought both with respect to the statutory scheme as a whole (facially) and
relative to the actual conditions and treatment experienced by a single indi-
vidual. 397 Moreover, like the U.S. Supreme Court in Seling v. Young,398 the
Washington Supreme Court not only ruled out "applied" claims sounding
in double jeopardy (or ex post facto), but it also specifically left open the
prospect for other as applied claims-presumably based on substantive due
process, though no such claims were before the court.3 99
More troublesome to the thesis advanced here are the court's pro-
nouncements, mainly in Turay, seemingly prescribing injunctive relief
rather than release from confinement as the appropriate remedy for uncon-
stitutional conditions.4" In large measure, these pronouncements are dicta,
because they pertain to the as applied claim that the court clearly held was
not before it. Even further outside the issue subjudice was the species of
claim of central interest here, one alleging a violation of substantive due
process on the expiration of the state's "reasonable opportunity" to provide
effective treatment.
To be sure, the holdings of the Washington Supreme Court have a
measure of merit. Not every instance of substandard conditions is suffi-
cient to upset a non-punitive statutory scheme. In addition, often the
proper remedy for substandard conditions is an injunction to repair the
deficiency; this is particularly where, as assumed by the Washington Su-
preme Court, progress is being made and the State is acting in "good
faith." 40
However, it would be a mistake to read the dicta about remedy as ex-
tending beyond these limited factual circumstances. The court has ac-
knowledged the essential underpinnings of a duration claim, including: The
duration principle itself,4"' the right to have as applied violations of the
right to treatment remedied," 3 and (at least by implication) the principle
that commitments, valid ab initio, become unconstitutional if the deficien-
cies are sufficiently punitive. 4 4 Further, the Washington Supreme Court's
reasoning in support of the "repair not release" dicta focused on the good
faith progress being made and the adequacy of the repair remedy. These
factors are entirely compatible with the "reasonable opportunity" theory
397 Id.
398 531 U.S. 250, 263, 265-67 (2001).
399 Turay, 986 P.2d at 812.400 Id.
401 Id. at 794 n.2.
402 In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1004-06 (Wash. 1993).
403 Turay, 986 P.2d at 794.
404 See id. at 812 (implying that release is justified if "deficiencies are 'so punitive' that they
wholly render the application of [the SVP law) criminal rather than civil").
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advanced here. The court's reliance on them suggests, by negative impli-
cation, that release will be the proper remedy when repair becomes hope-
less.
C. Applying Theory to Practice
Having established that a right to treatment exists with respect to SVP
commitments, and that courts are obliged to patrol continued confinements
with heightened care, what remains is a discussion of the criteria courts
should use in such assessments. As discussed, Youngberg dictates that
courts defer to, and state treatment programs adhere to, "professional
judgment,"4 5 which entails a "realistic opportunity to be cured."4 6 How-
ever, as also discussed, this deference is not without limit, and courts will
enforce this constitutional dictate, as an initial matter, by means of injunc-
tive relief compelling appropriate treatment.4 7
In this section we address a key question: Assuming that Youngberg
has been satisfied, what practical limits operate on the State's constitu-
tional authority to continue civil confinement? To this end, we formulate a
benchmark for judicial use, based on a rebuttable presumption that the
State's reasonable opportunity to provide treatment has expired. To create
this benchmark, we look to available empirical data on the length of sex
offender treatment programs, with an added temporal cushion in keeping
with the institutional deference owed the states in implementing their
treatment regimes. Once this augmented benchmark is breached, however,
the burden shifts to the State to prove that further confinement is reason-
able. 408
To set the reasonableness benchmark, courts can look first to empirical
data on sex offender treatment duration. In the correctional setting, most
state-run sex offender treatment programs extend for no more than three
405 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982); see also id. at 323 (requiring evidence of
"such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards ... that the
person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment").
406 Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2000). The "reasonable opportunity" stan-
dard was articulated as long ago as 1971 by Judge Frank M. Johnson in Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp.
781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd in part, revd in part, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974), which held that men-
tally ill patients "have a constitutional right to receive such individual treatment as will give each of
them a reasonable opportunity to be cured or to improve his or her mental condition." Id. at 784.
Later, a similar view was echoed by the Fifth Circuit in Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 522
(1974), vacated, O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
407 See supra notes 394-401 and accompanying text.
408 For discussion of how the absence of objective criteria hindered judicial review of whether
proper treatment had been afforded persons committed pursuant to earlier "sex psychopath" laws, see
Michael B. Roche, Note, The Plight of the Sexual Psychopath: A Legislative Blunder and Judicial
Acquiescence, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 527, 541-42 (1966).
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years."9 The treatment program in Kansas, for instance, was designed to
be completed in eighteen months."'0 Similarly, the well-known program
implemented by the California Department of Mental Health-the Sex
Offender Treatment and Evaluation Project-involves a "comprehensive
cognitive-behavioral treatment program" with an inpatient phase of ap-
proximately two years (fourteen to thirty months).4 ' A survey of Minne-
sota sex offender treatment programs in prisons and community settings
showed that the average length of treatment ranged from 2.5 months to 37
months.41 The Minnesota SVP program itself is designed to be completed
in a minimum of four years.4" 3
Thus, three years appears to be a rough benchmark for treatment
judged by professionals to achieve some treatment efficacy, if any is forth-
coming. Social science data suggest that beyond that point at best only a
small correlation exists between length of treatment and reductions in sex-
ual offending recidivism,4 4 raising the question of whether anything other
than the interest of incapacitation is being served. However, in light of the
deference rightfully accorded states in the implementation of their pro-
grams, we propose setting a benchmark for treatment efficacy at six
years-twice the average, and long enough to encompass longer programs,
such as Minnesota's, that are often held up as models."'
When an individual has been confined for longer than six years, a re-
buttable presumption should arise, requiring release in the absence of con-
vincing evidence from the state that further confinement is reasonable." 6
409MARY WEST ET AL., STATE SEX OFFENDER TREATMENT PROGRAMS (50-STATE SURVEY) 4
(2000).
410 McKune v. Lile, 122 S. Ct. 2017, 2025 (2002) (noting that the Kansas Sexual Abuse Treat-
ment Program lasts for eighteen months).
411 Janice K. Marques et al., Effects of Cognitive-Behavioral Treatment on Sex Offender Recidi-
vism: Preliminary Results of a Longitudinal Study, 21 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 28, 36 (1994).
412 MINN. OFFICE OF THE LEGIS. AUDITOR, SEX OFFENDER TREATMENT PROGRAMS 55-58
(1994).
413 E-mail from Anita Schlank, Ph.D., Clinical Director of Minnesota Sex Offender Program, to
Eric S. Janus (Aug. 19, 2002) (noting that most patients are unable to complete the program in the
minimum period) (correspondence on file with authors).
414 See R. Karl Hanson & Monique T. Bussi~re, Predicting Relapse: A Meta-Analysis of Sexual
Offender Recidivism Studies, 66 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 348, 352 (1998) (noting the
median correlation of "length of treatment" and recidivism as .00).
415 See Anita Schlank et al., The Minnesota Sex Offender Program, in THE SEXUAL PREDATOR:
LAW, POLICY, EVALUATION AND TREATMENT 10-14 (Anita Schlank & Fred Cohen eds., 1999) (de-
scribing the Minnesota program and noting its national prominence).
416Cf Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (stating that an individual charged with a
crime cannot be held longer than a "reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a
substantial probability that he will attain [the] capacity [to stand trial] in the foreseeable future").
As a practical matter, all state laws provide for some form of judicial review to ensure continuing
justification for the SVP commitment. These judicial proceedings, mandated by statute, assess danger-
ousness and mental disorder. The constitutional proposal advanced here adds an additional considera-
tion: Whether the duration of the confinement is proportional to the putative treatment purpose.
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Such evidence could assume any one or more of three types.
First, consistent with the individualized scrutiny demanded by Jackson,
the state could adduce evidence that this individual has made "progress
toward [the] goal"417 of release. This would enable the reviewing court to
assess whether "continued commitment [is] justified" because there is "a
substantial probability that he will attain [that goal] in the foreseeable fu-
ture."418 In so doing, the court would bear in mind the principle of Zadvy-
das that "for detention to remain reasonable, as the period of prior post-
removal confinement grows, what counts as the 'reasonably foreseeable
future' conversely would have to shrink." '419 The court would also be
mindful that treatment must be individualized, not group-based;42 ° that def-
erence is afforded to "professional judgment," not blanket policies and
blunderbuss approaches.' 2
Second, the state could argue that the lack of treatment progress was
the fault of the detainee,422 rather than arising from some shortcoming in
the treatment program. In assessing such an argument, courts should dis-
credit state justifications that ascribe blame to the very characteristics of
the committee that are the target of treatment, 12' because crediting such
explanations would essentially put the responsibility on the committee to
cure himself.
Third, courts should consider the state's practical public safety interest
Id.
418 Id.
419 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001).
420 Ohlinger v. Watson, 652 F.2d 775, 777-79 (9th Cir. 1980).
421 See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982) (stating that due process requires that
"the courts make certain that professional judgment in fact was exercised"); Lucas v. Peters, 741
N.E.2d 313, 324 (Ill. Ct. App. 2000) (noting "judicial duty to ensure that the professional's expertise
was actually brought into play"); see also Janice K. Marques, Professional Standards for Civil Com-
mitment Programs, in THE SEXUAL PREDATOR: LEGAL ISSUES, CLINICAL ISSUES, SPECIAL POPULA-
TIONS 2-9 (Anita Schlank ed., 2001) (including, as one of five mandatory standards for SVP treatment
programs, "treatment plans [that] are individualized and comprehensive").
422 The use of "fault" here is intended to encompass the willful decision of the individual to not
participate in or otherwise subvert the treatment process.
423 For example, "denial" of responsibility for sex crimes is often cited both as a target for treat-
ment modification, and as a reason for treatment failure. See Steven C. Brake & Diann Shannon, Using
Pretreatment to Increase Admission in Sex Offenders, in 2 THE SEX OFFENDER: NEW INSIGHTS,
TREATMENT INNOVATIONS AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS (Barbara K. Schwartz & Henry R. Cellini eds.,
1997). In addition, much sexual violence can be traced, at least in part, to character disorders and
"cognitive distortions," including assumptions and attitudes that are conducive to sexual violence. See,
e.g., Anita Schlank, Issues in the Assessment of Sexual Offenders' Cognitive Distortions, in 3 THE SEX
OFFENDER: THEORETICAL ADVANCES, TREATING SPECIAL POPULATIONS AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS
30-32 (Barbara K. Schwartz ed., 1999) (discussing the role of cognitive distortions in both sexual
offending and treatment).
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in continued confinement. Although all sexual abuse should be prevented,
the very existence of SVP programs424 and community notification regimes
that distinguish among sex offender types"' assumes that post-prison sex
offenders present a range of risks (both in terms of likelihood of re-offense
and severity). For instance, although not insignificant, the State's interest
in the lengthy confinement of a likely groper426 or exhibitionist4 7 is clearly
lower than its interest in confining one whose past and possible future
crimes involve sexual abuse of a more severe nature. The highest levels of
danger might justify lengthening the duration of commitment, but, as ar-
gued above, cannot support making it indefinite. Courts should evaluate
evidence of risk in light of research indicating that "the most effective
known technique for reducing risk of relapse is intensive supervision" in
the community,"' and that community "aftercare can be made sufficiently
'tight' to reduce risk to a minimum for many offenders."429 Reasonable-
ness decisions, particularly about SVP detainees who fall at the lower end
of the risk scale, need to take into account these methods to achieve public
safety in the community, short of full-blown institutional confinement.
Due process demands no less.
Finally, the courts should consider the strength of the State's interest in
using civil confinement, as opposed to the criminal justice system, in ad-
dressing possible future criminal sexual offending. As discussed, the
"normal" or "usual" means of addressing antisocial behavior involves post-
crime intervention through the criminal system. 430  That system remains
available for the vast majority of SVPs who are legally sane and thus fully
amenable to criminal prosecution, conviction, and incarceration. In con-
trast, for those rare SVPs whose mental conditions excuse them from future
criminal prosecution, the State's interest in civil confinement is heightened.
424 See, e.g., Eric S. Janus & Nancy H. Walbek, Sex Offender Commitments in Minnesota: A De-
scriptive Study of Second Generation Commitments, 18 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 343, 371 (2000) (observing a
wide variation among SVP committees on indices commonly associated with dangerousness).
425 See Doe v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 271 F.3d 38, 41-42 (2d Cir. 2001) (invalidating a state law
that failed to distinguish among sex offenders for purposes of effectuating community notification),
cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 1959 (2002); Wayne A. Logan, A Study in "Actuarial Justice": Sex Offender
Practice and Procedure, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 593, 602-19 (2000) (surveying variations in approaches
to classifying registrants for notification purposes).
426 See E-mail from Ron Thorsett to Eric S. Janus (Jul. 16, 2002) (describing SVP committee who
has been confined for 10 years, based on a single sex offense conviction for "fondling 10-12 year old
boys through their clothing").
427 Compare In re Rodriguez, 506 N.W.2d 660, 662-63 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that ap-
plication of the psychopathic personality statute to nonviolent exhibitionist is beyond both the statute's
intent and the precedent's narrowed definition), with In re Clements, 440 N.W.2d 133, 136-37 (Minn.
Ct. Ap?. 1989) (upholding SVP commitment of exhibitionist).
ROBERT A. PRENTKY & ANN W. BURGESS, FORENSIC MANAGEMENT OF SEXUAL OFFENDERS
236 (2000).
429 Id. at 243.
430 See supra notes 290-292 and accompanying text.
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This is because the criminal system is unavailable to incapacitate, thus
thwarting the State's legitimate interest in self-protection. For those indi-
viduals, the "reasonableness" calculation might yield a much longer period
of confinement, even for persons for whom treatment success does not
seem likely.4 3'
The foregoing formula is intended as a preliminary guide for courts to
make the otherwise utterly standardless reasonableness judgment. As with
any initial formulation, the discussion raises several potential concerns.
First, it might be argued that the presumptive period of six years is inap-
propriate. At this point in time, such an argument is unamenable to re-
sponse given the dearth of empirical evidence concerning treatment lengths
and their relationship to treatment efficacy. Second, it might be argued that
the formula introduces a disincentive that, rather than promoting necessary
therapy, in fact encourages SVPs to "wait out" treatment regimes for six
years in the hope of achieving outright release. This concern is addressed
in part by the state's opportunity to assert that treatment failure is attribut-
able to the committee.432 However, in a system that is entirely fraught with
conflicting incentives for cooperation and sabotage,433 it is impossible to
predict what influence the formula might have. In the end, however, any
negative collateral consequences would be outweighed by the positive ef-
fects of increased accountability and procedural fairness. 4
VI. CONCLUSION
In 1972, a unanimous Supreme Court remarked that, given the expan-
sive authority of government to involuntarily commit its citizens, and the
number of persons affected, it is "remarkable that the substantive constitu-
tional limitations on this power have not been more frequently litigated.
4 35
431See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 370 (1983) (approving continued commitment of in-
sanity acquitee, noting "the widely and reasonably held view that insanity acquitees constitute a special
class that should be treated differently than other candidates for commitment").
432 See supra note 422 and accompanying text.
433See, e.g., McKune v. Lile, 122 S. Ct. 2017, 2032 (2002) (upholding a state law that requires an
imprisoned sex offender to admit prior sex offenses in a treatment program, if the inmate is to avoid
being housed in less austere environs, while not offering immunity to prosecution because the law is
not violative of the right against compelled self-incrimination).
434 See TOM R. TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 176 (1997) (asserting that
"people who experience procedural justice when they deal with authorities are more likely to view
those authorities as legitimate, to accept their decisions, and to obey social rules"); TOM R. TYLER,
WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 108 (1990) (asserting that "[i]f people feel unfairly treated when they
deal with legal authorities, they then view the authorities as less legitimate and as a consequence obey
the law less frequently in their everyday lives"); Tom R. Tyler, Multiculturalism and the Willingness of
Citizens to Defer to Law and Legal Authorities, 25 LAW & SOc. INQUIRY 983, 989 (2000) (asserting
that "the key to the effectiveness of legal authorities lies in creating and maintaining the public view
that the authorities are functioning fairly").
435 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 737 (1972).
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Thirty years later, those substantive boundaries remain largely uneluci-
dated, providing willing states with the latitude to augment their police
power to preventively detain those they believe dangerous. This is cer-
tainly so with respect to sex offenders, a criminal sub-population that in-
spires unique fear, disdain, and social concern.
The authority to detain sex offenders under civil auspices is neither
new nor novel. From the 1930s to the 1970s the states made expansive use
of involuntary civil commitment, imposed in lieu of criminal conviction,
by means of "sexually dangerous persons" and "sex psychopath" provi-
sions. 36 In time, the laws fell into disuse, largely out of concern that the
regimes were both ineffective and unjust, essentially "warehouses for so-
cial misfits," masquerading as psychiatric science. Undeterred by this
failed experiment, however, involuntary commitment experienced a resur-
gence of interest in the early 1990s, this time under the gist of "sexually
violent predator" laws, which, unlike predecessor laws, confine individuals
after serving prison terms and not in lieu of them. The new laws have
withstood constitutional challenge before the Supreme Court, redeemed in
large part by the prospect that they will afford treatment and hence some
meaningful prospect of release. As Justice Kennedy stated in lending his
qualified support to the Kansas SVP law in Hendricks, "[i]f ... civil con-
finement were to become a mechanism for retribution or general deterrence
.. our precedents would not suffice to validate it."
437
Five years after Hendricks, and almost thirteen years after Washington
State adopted the nation's first modem SVP law, the time has come for
such a fair-minded scrutiny to take place. It is not simply, as this Article
has argued, that the Constitution requires it. There are, as well, compelling
policy grounds for courts to recognize and enforce a real promise of treat-
ment, sufficient to distinguish SVP laws from preventive detention.
First, as time passes-and if SVP regimes continue to be beset with
dismally low release rates-the illusory nature of the treatment promise
will become undeniable. Eventually, the integrity of treatment profession-
als will compel them to spotlight the sham, calling the social control ex-
periment, once again, into disrepute. Moreover, the danger exists that the
taint will not be limited to SVP programs, but will spread to other efforts to
combat sexual violence. Serious and innovative efforts are now underway
to develop and validate tools for assessing, managing, and ameliorating the
risk of sexual violence. These efforts depend on funding and public confi-
dence that progress is possible in the fight against sexual violence. The
436 See Eric S. Janus, Sexual Predators, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1475-76
(Joshua Dressier ed., 2002).
437 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 373 (1997) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Hubbart v.
Superior Court, 969 P.2d 584, 612 (Cal. 1999) (Werdegar, J., concurring) ("The concrete facts of some
future proceeding may force this or another court to confront the potential constitutional limits of [the
SVP law].").
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failure of the most aggressive and visible response to sexual violence might
well inspire the pessimistic surmise, not unknown to the justice system,
that "nothing works," '438 prompting a withdrawal of resources for these
positive efforts.
On a more concrete level, SVP programs consume prodigious re-
sources.439 Continued commitments, with few or no discharges, produce a
captive population that is not only growing in absolute numbers, but also as
a proportion of sex offenders under confinement. The share of state pre-
vention and supervision resources going to SVP programs, rather than to
community-based programs, will grow correspondingly. The result is a
vast misallocation of resources, given that SVP programs contain only a
small fraction of sexually violent individuals, compared against the multi-
tude of sex offenders in communities and correctional systems."O
The solution, short of abandoning SVP laws, is the enforcement of a
treatment efficacy requirement. The principle of treatment efficacy, as a
matter of pure public policy, has common sense origins: Offenders should
be detained in the specialized confines of SVP facilities only for such time
as there is reason to hope that treatment effort, will prove warranted.
When that window closes, they should be moved to the community, under
close supervision as permitted by law, and subject, like other potential re-
cidivists, to the criminal justice system should they commit another crimi-
nal offense.
Courts are properly reluctant to curtail the discretion enjoyed by state
officials in the administration of complex institutions, especially those that
depend on the close working involvement of psychiatric professionals.
Sometimes, however, states need courts to intervene to protect them from
their own misjudgments, in effect to provide cover. Having embarked on
the SVP path, no politician or state administrator can afford the political
risk associated with curtailing the unbridled growth of these popular pro-
grams. In the end, duration-related treatment efficacy requirement does not
merely bring SVP programs into line with the due process constraints of
438 The phrase "nothing works" was coined in a seminal 1974 article by Robert Martinson, which
triggered a decades-long retrenchment in progressive criminal justice programming. Robert Martinson,
What Works?-Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INT. 22, 48 (1974). See gener-
ally FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL (1981) (surveying retrench-
ment).
439 See Samuel Jon Brakel & James L. Cavanaugh, Of Psychopaths and Pendulums: Legal and
Psychiatric Treatment of Sex Offenders in the United States, 30 N.M. L. REV. 69, 89 (2000) (noting
that in California, housing and treatment costs for SVPs are five times the costs associated with general
imprisonment); John Q. LaFond, The Costs of Enacting a Sexual Predator Law, 4 PSYCHOL., PUB.
POL'Y, & L. 468,476-84 (1998) (surveying program implementation costs in several states).44 0See LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, SEX OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DATA ON
RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT v-vi (1997) (noting that on a given day roughly 234,000 sex offenders are
under correctional care of custody, with about sixty percent being under community supervision).
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the Constitution. It also functions to place sensible limits on what might
prove a failed strategy, thereby allowing scarce resources to be redirected
to more effective uses.
